UEFA v. FIFA: Four Section 1782 Applications, Tracked

This page tracks the four applications the Union des Associations Européennes de Football has filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for discovery in aid of a criminal complaint it says it is preparing in Switzerland against Gianni Infantino, and possibly other FIFA officials, for criminal mismanagement under Article 158 of the Swiss Criminal Code. UEFA seeks documents and testimony from FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries, from the proposed investors in the withdrawn FIFA Forward Enterprise transaction, and from the bankers who valued it. Everything UEFA says about Infantino’s conduct is an allegation in a pending application. No one has been charged, and no court has ruled. I will update this page as the dockets move; the log is at the end.

Most press coverage counts three applications, but in fact there are four. The fourth, against J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and two of the bank’s executives, was filed in Manhattan a day after the other three. The filings matter for Section 1782 practice because they put the same ordinary questions before four courts at once: whether the statute reaches a criminal case nobody has filed, whether an applicant who is not the prosecutor is an “interested person,” whether the evidence is “for use” in that case, and what a court does with an arbitration clause between the applicant and the target.

This story has two parts. The first is the dispute abroad. UEFA alleges that a small group around Infantino advanced a plan to sell a permanent stake in FIFA’s commercial business without the FIFA Council, the body FIFA’s Statutes put in charge of those rights. FIFA’s leadership wrote on August 5 that “everything that was done, was done in full compliance with the FIFA regulatory framework,” as UEFA quotes the letter. The plan was withdrawn within days of its announcement, and no stake was sold. The second part is the fight in U.S. courts over whether Section 1782 lets UEFA gather evidence here for a Swiss complaint it has not filed.

The rules: who decides at FIFA

FIFA’s Statutes (May 2024 edition) divide power among three bodies. The Congress is “the supreme and legislative body,” and each member association has one vote in it (Article 26(1)); UEFA’s application puts the membership at 211 associations. The Council, “the strategic and oversight body,” has 37 members, including the President (Article 33(1)). The general secretariat, under Secretary General Mattias Grafström, manages “the operations and day-to-day business of FIFA, in accordance with the parameters established by the Council” (Article 36(1)). The President chairs the Council and has “one ordinary vote” on it (Article 35(4)).

FIFA’s commercial rights include “audiovisual and radio recording, reproduction and broadcasting rights,” “marketing and promotional rights,” and “emblems” (Article 59(1)). Article 59(2) leaves the decision on those rights to the Council: “The Council shall decide how and to what extent these rights are utilised and draw up special regulations to this end. The Council shall decide alone whether these rights shall be utilised exclusively, or jointly with a third party, or entirely through a third party.” That rule is the center of UEFA’s case. UEFA alleges that the plan moved forward to a signed term sheet without the Council’s involvement (Thrive application at 23).

The Waldorf Astoria meeting

UEFA’s account of how the plan was approved inside FIFA comes from The New York Times. Per the Times, five top FIFA directors, “an inner circle of FIFA’s management board closest to Infantino, whose role is to review significant financial transactions,” were “summoned to a hastily organized meeting at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in Manhattan” on July 18, 2026, the day before the World Cup final (Thrive application at 22). Most of them had not heard of the plan, the application says, and they were given until midnight to sign off. Infantino was not there, UEFA says, but the directors “left the meeting with the impression that Infantino would be furious if they stalled” (id.).

Per the application, the vote was three to two. Secretary General Grafström, Chief Legal and Compliance Officer Emilio García, and Chief of Staff Dan O’Toole signed off. FIFA’s then-Chief Operating Officer, Kevin Lamour, and finance chief Thomas Peyer “declined to back it” (id. at 22–23). Per the Times, “only O’Toole, who was handpicked by Infantino to work with the bankers, had any meaningful role in developing the plan” (id. at 23). The application also says Grafström was “reportedly excluded from the drafting,” citing the Associated Press (id. at 21). UEFA says Lamour told the Associated Press that FIFA staff had been “deceived,” and that “[j]ust over two weeks after criticizing Infantino,” he “was ousted from FIFA” (id. at 22).

The deal: FIFA Forward Enterprise

The plan would have created FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), a new FIFA subsidiary holding the commercial rights to the men’s World Cup, the Women’s World Cup, and the Club World Cup (Thrive application at 1). UEFA says FIFA proposed to “sell approximately 20 percent of it to outside investors at an implied valuation of roughly $20 billion,” raising about $4.2 billion (id. at 24).

UEFA alleges that Infantino “unilaterally designated” Thrive Eternal, “a permanent-capital investment vehicle controlled by Joshua Kushner and affiliated with Thrive Capital,” to lead the investor group, and that Greg Maffei, the CEO of BANN Ventures and formerly President and CEO of Liberty Media, was retained as Infantino’s “key commercial adviser” on the transaction (id. at 2). Kushner founded Thrive Capital and is the brother of Jared Kushner (id. at 19). Thrive, Kushner, Maffei, and BANN are respondents in the U.S. cases. UEFA asks them for evidence, and no one has charged them with anything.

FIFA announced the plan on July 28, 2026. Infantino said investors would take no operational role and that “For FIFA, nothing changes” (id. at 24). FIFA’s announcement said FIFA “would retain sole control of FFE,” as the J.P. Morgan respondents quote it (J.P. Morgan opposition at 5). UEFA reads the terms differently: “For the first time ever, outside investors would acquire an ownership interest in the commercial enterprise built around FIFA’s competitions” (Thrive application at 24).

The offer to FIFA’s member associations, per UEFA, was “a one-off payment of up to $20 million tied to approval of the FFE transaction,” conditioned on approval by September 19, 2026, about 53 days after the announcement (id. at 30–31). UEFA adds that the payment was “payable from FIFA’s own reserves and future revenues,” so members “were offered a share of FIFA’s existing funds conditioned on their approval of the permanent sale of a share in FIFA’s future funds” (id. at 31).

The price: the $20 billion valuation

FIFA’s FAQ referred to an “implied equity valuation of USD 20 billion, determined by J.P. Morgan based on customary valuation analysis,” as the J.P. Morgan respondents quote it (J.P. Morgan opposition at 6). They say J.P. Morgan “was retained as FIFA’s financial advisor during 2026” (id.). UEFA calls the figure “demonstrably low, potentially by as much as $10 billion (or more)” (J.P. Morgan application at 4). The respondents answer that UEFA “erroneously alleges that J.P. Morgan undervalued FFE,” and that the $20 billion figure was an equity valuation, not an enterprise valuation (J.P. Morgan opposition at 6).

The secret: how the plan started, according to UEFA

UEFA says, “[u]pon information and belief,” that the plan was first discussed between Kushner and Maffei at a finance conference in Sun Valley, Idaho, in July 2025. In Maffei’s account, as UEFA recounts it, Kushner approached him there, and the two discussed the concept “under some trees” (Thrive application at 19). UEFA says Infantino had been discussing the idea with Kushner “for nearly a year before the terms sheet was ultimately signed” (id.).

Inside FIFA, UEFA says, “[t]he FIFA Council, FIFA’s six confederations, and its 211 national member associations were not aware of the scheme” (id. at 21). Its tally of how far the plan had gone: “a signed term sheet, an identified lead investor, a dubious valuation, a 25-page investor solicitation deck, and a management-level internal approval, all without the involvement of the FIFA Council” (id. at 23).

The revolt

On July 28, the day FIFA announced the plan, Infantino outlined it to the Council by letter (Thrive application at 17). UEFA said the proposal “crosses a line” (id. at 33). On July 30, at an emergency meeting, UEFA’s 55 member associations “unanimously decided to not participate in any FIFA competition, including the World Cup itself, unless the plan was completely withdrawn” (id. at 2). CONCACAF, the confederation for North and Central America and the Caribbean, and the Asian Football Confederation “separately joined” (id.).

Some FIFA insiders learned of the plan from the press, UEFA says. Arsène Wenger, FIFA’s Chief of Global Football Development, said he “first became aware of the project through media reports.” Carlos Cordeiro, a senior adviser to Infantino, resigned, calling the plan “a bad deal for football” (id. at 21–22).

The retreat

The plan was withdrawn within days, although the filings give conflicting dates. UEFA says that “[b]y August 1, 2026, Infantino conceded the transaction as proposed would not proceed” and that “[o]n August 1, he abandoned” the proposal (Thrive application at 3, 36). The J.P. Morgan respondents say that “FIFA withdrew the FFE Proposal on July 31, 2026, within days of its public announcement, before obtaining the required support and approval,” and that “no ownership interest therefore was sold or transferred” (J.P. Morgan opposition at 5). FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries also give July 31 (FIFA U.S. memorandum at 5). Neither the Council nor the member associations voted on the plan.

In an August 5 joint letter, as UEFA quotes it, Infantino and Grafström told FIFA’s members that “it should have been handled differently,” and also that “although mistakes were made, everything that was done, was done in full compliance with the FIFA regulatory framework” (Thrive application at 37). Grafström reportedly described the episode internally as a “sad and reproachable series of events” (id. at 21). UEFA’s Florida reply calls those “FIFA’s words” (Florida reply at 1).

The Swiss case UEFA says it is preparing

UEFA says it and its counsel are contemplating a criminal proceeding in Switzerland, where FIFA is based, against Infantino “and possibly other FIFA officials for criminal mismanagement under Article 158 of the Swiss Criminal Code” (Thrive application at 37; Kurz declaration ¶ 15). It has not filed a complaint, and no one has been charged.

Article 158 of the Swiss Criminal Code, headed “Criminal mismanagement,” reaches any person entrusted with “the management of the property of another or the supervision of such management” who, “in the course of and in breach of their duties causes or permits that other person to sustain financial loss.” Paragraph 1 sets the penalty at “a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty,” and at “a custodial sentence not exceeding five years” where the offender acts “with the intention of securing an unlawful gain for themselves or another.” UEFA’s application quotes that text (Thrive application at 37–38). UEFA’s theory, in its Florida reply: “Infantino’s exclusion of the Council from the FFE proposal lies at the heart of the alleged criminal mismanagement” (Florida reply at 5).

FIFA’s side answers through Alain Macaluso, a professor at the University of Lausanne Law School and a partner at the Geneva law firm Poncet Turrettini Avocats, whose declaration FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries filed in Florida and the J.P. Morgan respondents filed in New York. As the J.P. Morgan opposition summarizes it, the commercial rights belong to FIFA, so any loss would be FIFA’s and not UEFA’s, and the plan still needed the member associations and the Council, so “Infantino lacked the independent managerial authority to carry out FFE” (J.P. Morgan opposition at 9). Both sides’ experts agree that a Swiss prosecutor, not UEFA, decides whether there is a case (Kurz declaration ¶ 25; Macaluso declaration ¶¶ 22, 24). Macaluso’s view of the present state: “Simply put, nothing is happening in Switzerland concerning the facts alleged by UEFA” (Macaluso declaration ¶ 20).

Where each application stands

The bridge: why UEFA came to U.S. courts

UEFA says it seeks the evidence “to support its contemplated criminal claims in Switzerland,” and that Swiss procedure gives it no “meaningful means of obtaining” the records it wants from the U.S. respondents (Thrive application at 48; Kurz declaration ¶ 27). On August 27 and 28, 2026, it filed four applications in three federal districts, together “asking the courts to authorize a total of 20 subpoenas,” by the J.P. Morgan respondents’ count (J.P. Morgan opposition at 7). The table above gives each case’s status; the sections below explain the statute and what UEFA asks each respondent for.

The statute reaches a criminal case that has not been filed

In plain terms, the statute lets a federal judge order a person or company in the judge’s district to hand over documents or testify for use in a foreign case. A foreign court can ask, and so can “any interested person.” The judge may grant the request but need not. UEFA says the statute lets it gather evidence now for a Swiss complaint it has not filed. Its opponents say there is no Swiss case to use the evidence in.

Section 1782(a) authorizes a district court to order a person who “resides or is found” in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.” That last clause carries the weight in these filings, because UEFA describes a complaint it is preparing rather than one it has filed.

The authority for the point deserves care. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), is the Supreme Court’s principal Section 1782 decision, but it arose from an antitrust complaint to the European Commission and did not decide the scope of the criminal-investigation clause. The clause stands on the statutory text, and in the Eleventh Circuit it stands on circuit precedent as well. In Furstenberg Fin. SAS v. Litai Assets LLC, 877 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2017), the court held that foreign criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation “are proceedings within the meaning of § 1782.” That holding binds the Southern District of Florida, where one of the four applications is pending.

The U.S. cases: who UEFA asks, and for what

All four applications seek documents and deposition testimony. The status table above tracks each docket; this section says what UEFA asks for.

Manhattan: Thrive Capital and Joshua Kushner (S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-mc-00431). UEFA seeks documents on “the origination and development of the FFE proposal,” valuation work performed by or shared with Thrive or Kushner, and “the terms on which Thrive Eternal” would invest, plus depositions (Thrive application at 40). FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries moved to intervene on September 1 and asked the court to defer until Florida rules (FIFA U.S. memorandum at 1). That motion is pending.

Manhattan: J.P. Morgan and two executives (S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-mc-00436). The respondents are J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell. UEFA says, “As FIFA’s advisor on FFE, JPMorgan has critical documents and information related to the project, as do Erdoes and Menell, who oversaw the deal at JPMorgan” (J.P. Morgan application at 2). It seeks the bank’s valuation work, investor lists, and pitch materials, plus testimony (id. at 2–5). Judge Jeannette A. Vargas has both Manhattan cases. On September 21 she declined to wait for Florida: she will rule “applying the law of this Circuit, whatever decision the court hearing the Florida application reaches,” and the Florida discovery targets “are U.S. subsidiaries of FIFA. They are different parties to the discovery targets in this application” (docket entry 22, at 2). The respondents opposed on October 15, and UEFA’s reply is due October 29.

South Florida: FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries (S.D. Fla. No. 1:26-cv-25872). The respondents are FIFA (Americas), Inc., which UEFA calls “FIFA’s domestic operational arm,” and FWC2026 US, Inc., the entity responsible for hosting the 2026 World Cup (Florida application at 3). UEFA seeks their internal records, including materials on “the July 18, 2026 meeting of FIFA officials at the Waldorf Astoria” (id. at 42). Briefing on the application is complete, and Magistrate Judge Eduardo I. Sanchez has had the case since October 6.

Colorado: Greg Maffei and BANN Ventures (D. Colo. No. 1:26-mc-00158). UEFA seeks documents and communications on “[t]he origination and development of the FFE proposal, including communications with Infantino, Thrive Capital, Kushner, and other FIFA officials and employees, advisors or intermediaries,” and “[a]ny valuation work performed by or shared with BANN or Maffei” (Colorado application, ECF pages 52–53). Maffei and BANN asked the court to defer until Florida rules, and UEFA opposes a stay. Both that motion and the subsidiaries’ motion to intervene are with Magistrate Judge Timothy P. O’Hara.

The other side

The J.P. Morgan respondents call the case “a proxy battle” in UEFA’s long-running conflict with FIFA (J.P. Morgan opposition at 1). “There is no criminal proceeding contemplated by Swiss authorities,” they write, and UEFA is “asserting a nonexistent right to launch a criminal investigation in America so it can ultimately call a Swiss tip hotline” (id. at 4). FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries told the New York court that UEFA’s filings “are little more than press releases in further support of UEFA’s smear campaign against FIFA and its leadership” (FIFA U.S. memorandum at 1). Both also rely on the FIFA Statutes’ dispute-resolution articles, discussed below under the arbitration clause.

The Swiss-law gap, as FIFA’s side frames it, is about who may take part in a Swiss case. As “a mere reporter,” the J.P. Morgan respondents say, UEFA would have “no right or legal standing to compel” an investigation (J.P. Morgan opposition at 8). If a prosecutor declines to act, Macaluso says, “UEFA could not challenge this decision in court” (Macaluso declaration ¶ 22). UEFA answers in its Florida reply that it is an anticipated complainant under Article 301 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, that “aggrieved party” status is one “UEFA does not presently claim” (Florida reply at 5), and that the statute reaches “criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation” (id. at 1). It says FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries tried “to blame UEFA for FIFA’s own goal” (id.). The sections that follow take up these questions in turn.

Proving reasonable contemplation

Intel requires only that a dispositive ruling be “within reasonable contemplation,” and it rejected the view that the foreign proceeding must be “pending” or “imminent.” Permissive is not the same as empty. A district court “is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so.”

Two decisions issued on August 26, 2026, the day before UEFA filed, show what the standard asks for.

In In re Application of Biogen MA, Inc., No. 1:23-mc-00260 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2026), the court denied the respondent’s motion to vacate a Section 1782 order and quash the subpoena. On “for use,” it held that an applicant “must provide reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time.” The contemplated case was a patent infringement action in Italy, and the applicant had identified the patents, the cause of action, and the evidence it needed to meet Italian pleading requirements.

In In re Ex Parte Application of Allan Green, Candel & Partners, and Digital Innovations Holding, No. 1:26-mc-00166 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2026), Judge Furman granted an application for a contemplated French proceeding and then cut the discovery back substantially. Applying the Second Circuit’s standard, he required a “concrete basis from which [the court] can determine that the contemplated proceeding is more than just a twinkle in counsel’s eye,” quoting In re Hornbeam Corp., 722 F. App’x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2018), which in turn quoted Certain Funds, Accounts &/or Investment Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2015). The contemplated proceeding grew out of a tender offer before the Autorité des Marchés Financiers, whose ruling may be appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal.

The Eleventh Circuit uses the same formulation. In Furstenberg it asked whether the applicants had produced “reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time,” quoting Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA) Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014). Delaware, New York, and the Eleventh Circuit are asking one question in the same words.

The decisions point the same way. What converts a plan into a contemplated proceeding is a record: an identified forum, identified claims or charges, and a declaration from counsel qualified in that forum. The UEFA applications rest in part on a declaration of Swiss counsel dated August 26, 2026. For the contrast between a record that carries the burden and one that does not, see Reasonable Contemplation Under Section 1782: Two S.D.N.Y. Decisions, One Day Apart.

Measured against those decisions, the applications identify the charge, the forum, and Swiss counsel, and they attach a long factual record. They do not commit to a filing date. The Furstenberg applicants promised to file within forty-five days of receiving the discovery, and the Eleventh Circuit relied on that promise.

The harder question: “for use,” and the two tiers of Swiss procedure

Section 1782 asks not only whether the evidence is relevant but whether the applicant can put it into the foreign case. Intel treated the complainant before the European Commission as an interested person because it had “the right to submit information” to the investigating authority and could “proceed to court if the Commission discontinues the investigation or dismisses the complaint.” The participation rights did the work. In Certain Funds, Accounts &/or Investment Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit drew the line on the “for use” element and affirmed a denial: “Without some means of injecting the evidence into the proceeding, a § 1782 applicant cannot show that it has a role in the proceeding, such that it may ‘use’ the information.” Furnishing information to someone who may or may not use it is not enough; the court likened it to “a witness approaching a prosecutor’s office claiming to have knowledge of a crime.” That decision binds both New York courts. Furstenberg, which binds the Florida court, went the other way on facts that had the rights Intel cared about: the Luxembourg applicants could submit information to the investigating judge, and “any of the parties can appeal a decision not to proceed.”

Whether UEFA has such a role is a question of Swiss procedure, and the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code has two tiers. Article 301(1) gives the first: “Any person is entitled to report an offence to a criminal justice authority.” Article 301(3) states its limit: “A person making a report who has neither suffered loss nor injury nor is a private claimant has no further procedural rights.” The second tier is the private claimant, a “person suffering harm,” meaning one “whose rights have been directly violated by the offence” (Article 115(1)), who declares that it wishes to take part as a criminal or civil claimant (Article 118(1)); filing a criminal complaint counts as that declaration (Article 118(2)). A private claimant is a party (Article 104(1)), with the right to inspect the file, take part in procedural acts, comment, and “request that further evidence be taken” (Article 107(1)), to be heard before the investigation closes (Article 318(1)), and to contest a ruling abandoning the proceedings within ten days (Article 322(2)), a rule that also governs a no-proceedings order (Article 310(2)). A private claimant therefore holds exactly the rights Intel and Furstenberg relied on. A mere reporter holds none.

UEFA’s Swiss-law declaration claims the first tier. Paragraph 23 rests UEFA’s standing on Article 301(1) and states that the offense “is prosecuted ex officio irrespective of an application from an aggrieved person as defined by Article 115.” Paragraph 25 adds that the targets and the charges “will not be decided by UEFA but by the competent Swiss public prosecutor.” The declaration does not assert that UEFA is a person suffering harm under Article 115 or that UEFA will join as a private claimant under Article 118. FIFA’s side argues that any harm under Article 158 would fall on FIFA, not UEFA. Its Swiss-law expert, Alain Macaluso, says UEFA “cannot be harmed by acts of mismanagement (if indeed they existed) committed in the course of FIFA’s management,” so “its sole role could be that of reporting an alleged offense” (Macaluso declaration ¶ 29). The J.P. Morgan respondents add that “the commercial rights at issue belong to FIFA” (J.P. Morgan opposition at 2).

The showing that would cure this is not hard to describe. In B&C KB Holding GmbH v. Goldberg Lindsay & Co., No. 23-1014 (2d Cir. June 26, 2024) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed a grant for an Austrian criminal investigation on an attestation that the prosecutor “will be obligated to consider any evidence submitted,” and described “for use” as the applicant’s “practical ability to inject the requested information into a foreign proceeding.” A supplemental declaration that either establishes UEFA’s status as a private claimant or establishes a comparable obligation on the Swiss prosecutor would go to that question. UEFA filed a supplemental declaration of its Swiss counsel with its Florida reply; the reply says “aggrieved party” status is one “UEFA does not presently claim” (Florida reply at 5). Certain Funds binds the New York courts and Furstenberg binds the Florida court, and the two decisions came out differently on their facts.

FIFA’s answer

FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries have now answered on the merits in Florida. On September 28, FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. filed a response in opposition to the application (S.D. Fla. docket entry 27), with a declaration of Professor Alain Macaluso and a compendium of sources. No free copy of the opposition is available. UEFA’s reply of October 5 (docket entry 28), which is available, describes the opposition as arguing that UEFA relies on a Swiss criminal proceeding that has not been filed and that UEFA lacks authority to initiate; that the discovery is not “for use” in that proceeding; that the arbitration provisions of the FIFA Statutes bar discovery under ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022); that UEFA’s claim of criminal mismanagement fails on the Swiss-law merits; that Swiss authorities could seek the evidence themselves; and that the application was filed to harass. I take up the arbitration point in the next section.

Their intervention memoranda of September 1 raised the same themes and asked the New York and Colorado courts to defer until Florida rules. On September 21 the New York court denied the J.P. Morgan respondents’ request for a stay (S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-mc-00436, docket entry 22). In Colorado, the motion to intervene and the motion to defer are pending before the magistrate judge. In the J.P. Morgan case, the respondents filed a memorandum of law in opposition and a supporting declaration on October 15 (docket entries 25 and 26), and UEFA’s reply is due October 29. The Updates log below records each filing.

The arbitration clause FIFA relies on

FIFA’s memoranda cite Article 51 of the FIFA Statutes (May 2024 edition) but do not quote it. The article is titled “Obligations relating to dispute resolution.” Its first paragraph requires confederations, member associations, and leagues to “recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority.” Its second paragraph reads: “Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited.” Article 49 has FIFA recognize the Court of Arbitration for Sport “to resolve disputes between FIFA, member associations, confederations, leagues, clubs, players, officials, football agents and match agents.” Article 50 gives CAS jurisdiction over “appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies,” lodged within 21 days, after internal channels are exhausted. Read together, these are a bar on ordinary courts and an appeal clause, not a broad agreement to arbitrate every disagreement.

Two problems follow. First, FIFA withdrew the proposal on July 31 or August 1, 2026 (the filings differ; see The retreat), before any vote of the member associations or the Council, so there is no final FIFA decision for UEFA to take to CAS under Article 50. Second, a criminal report to a Swiss prosecutor is not a dispute between FIFA and a confederation that CAS resolves. Article 301(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code lets any person report an offense, and the statutes of a private association do not take that right away. UEFA’s applications and its Swiss-law declaration do not mention arbitration or CAS at all.

What the clause gives FIFA is an argument about where this grievance belongs. Article 51 shows that UEFA agreed to keep its disputes with FIFA inside the football system, and a court may weigh that under Intel’s third factor when it asks whether UEFA is using Section 1782 to get around limits it accepted elsewhere. In Florida there is also a procedural route: courts in that district have held that a Section 1782 application is itself a “proceeding” under the Federal Arbitration Act, so a party bound by an arbitration clause that covers the dispute can be ordered to arbitrate and the discovery stayed, even after an ex parte grant. In re Application of Motransa, S.A., No. 1:19-mc-25026 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2020). That motion needs an agreement that covers the controversy before the court. FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries argue that Article 51 obliges UEFA to arbitrate its disputes with FIFA (FIFA U.S. memorandum at 6); UEFA argues that a report to Swiss prosecutors is not an arbitrable dispute. In New York, B&C KB Holding is the closer precedent: an applicant in a pending arbitration filed a criminal complaint with Austrian prosecutors, the respondent called it a pretext, and the Second Circuit held that pretext goes to the court’s discretion and to use restrictions, not to the statutory “for use” element. The cure there was an order limiting use of the material in the arbitration, not a denial. No court has ruled on the arbitration argument in any of the four cases.

Where it stands

Abroad, UEFA has not filed its Swiss complaint, and no filing in the four U.S. cases reports a Swiss investigation or a charge. In the United States, the courts face the question of whether UEFA, which may have no formal role in a Swiss case it hopes to start, can use U.S. courts to build that case first. Every ruling so far has been on procedure, including the September 21 order declining to pause the J.P. Morgan case. UEFA’s reply in the J.P. Morgan case is due October 29, 2026.

As of October 22, 2026, the public dockets show that no court has ruled on any of UEFA’s four applications, and the four cases are at different stages. Florida is the only one in which briefing on the application itself is complete. FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries opposed on September 28 (docket entry 27), UEFA replied on October 5 (docket entry 28), and on October 6 Judge Martinez referred the case to Magistrate Judge Eduardo I. Sanchez for rulings on pretrial non-dispositive matters and a report and recommendation on any dispositive matters (docket entry 29). The application is ready for decision. If the court treats it as dispositive, the first decision will be a report and recommendation, which Judge Martinez would then review.

In the J.P. Morgan case in New York, the respondents filed their opposition on October 15 (docket entries 25 and 26). In the Thrive case, also before Judge Vargas, the last filing is UEFA’s September 10 opposition to the subsidiaries’ motion to intervene (docket entry 21). That motion is pending, and the docket sets no schedule for an opposition to the application. In Colorado, the subsidiaries’ motion to intervene and the motion by BANN Ventures, Inc. and Gregory B. Maffei to defer ruling and set a coordinated briefing schedule are both with Magistrate Judge Timothy P. O’Hara, the latest filing being their October 9 brief (docket entry 27). No schedule on the application has been set there.

The questions this page has followed are now squarely before the courts: whether a complaint UEFA has not filed is within reasonable contemplation, whether UEFA would have a role in a Swiss case that lets it use the evidence, and what weight the arbitration clause in the FIFA Statutes carries. The respondents in Florida and in the J.P. Morgan case have put each of them in their oppositions, and UEFA has answered in Florida. The status table reflects the dockets as checked on October 22, 2026: the Florida docket on PACER, the federal courts’ public records service, for filings since October 1, through docket entry 29; the Thrive docket on PACER for filings since September 1, through docket entry 21; and the J.P. Morgan docket on the free public record, refreshed that day. The free public copy of the Colorado docket was last refreshed on October 16, 2026, so a Colorado filing made after that date may not yet appear there.

Updates

• October 22, 2026. Dockets re-checked: Florida on PACER for filings since October 1, through docket entry 29; Thrive on PACER for filings since September 1, through docket entry 21; J.P. Morgan on the free public record, refreshed October 22; and Colorado on the free public record, refreshed through October 16. No new entry appears on any of them since the October 16 update. The latest entries remain S.D. Fla. docket entry 29 (October 7), S.D.N.Y. (Thrive) docket entry 21 (September 10), D. Colo. docket entry 27 (October 9), and S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan) docket entry 26 (October 15). No ruling on any application. UEFA’s reply in the J.P. Morgan case remains due October 29 (docket entry 24). Passages that stated expectations about how the courts would rule now state what the parties argue. The lead photograph was replaced with a composite of Infantino and Čeferin, and the caption credits both photographers.
• October 19, 2026. Page expanded with an account of the FIFA Forward Enterprise plan and the dispute abroad, drawn from the filings and cited by docket entry and page, new sections on what UEFA asks each respondent for and on the other side’s arguments, filing excerpts, and section links. The two withdrawal dates in the filings, July 31 and August 1, are now both stated. No new docket activity is recorded in this entry; the status table is as of October 16, 2026.
• October 16, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): On October 15, Respondents J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell filed their opposition and asked the court to deny the application, with oral argument requested (docket entries 25 and 26; entry 26 attaches the Swiss-law declaration of Professor Alain Macaluso that FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. filed in the Florida case). They argue that UEFA has not shown a Swiss criminal proceeding is reasonably contemplated, that a person who only reports an offense has no participation rights and so could not use the evidence there, that UEFA is not an interested person, and that the first, third, and fourth Intel factors weigh against discovery. UEFA’s reply is due October 29. No ruling on the application.
• October 11, 2026. D. Colo.: Respondents BANN Ventures, Inc. and Gregory B. Maffei filed a brief on October 9 (docket entry 27) in support of their motion to defer ruling and for a coordinated briefing schedule. The brief itself was not reviewed because no free copy was available. No ruling on the motion to intervene, the motion to defer, or the application.
• October 7, 2026. S.D. Fla.: On October 6, Judge Jose E. Martinez, on his own review of the record, referred the case to Magistrate Judge Eduardo I. Sanchez for rulings on all pretrial, non-dispositive matters and for a report and recommendation on any dispositive matters (docket entry 29, entered October 7). No ruling on the application.
• October 6, 2026. S.D. Fla.: UEFA filed its reply in support of its application on October 5 (docket entry 28), answering the September 28 opposition of Respondents FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. UEFA argues that Section 1782 reaches criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation, so the contemplated Swiss complaint need only be within reasonable contemplation, not pending or imminent; that it is an interested person with a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial assistance, as an anticipated complainant under article 301 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code; that the arbitration clause is irrelevant because ZF Automotive concerned private arbitral panels, while Swiss prosecutors are bodies imbued with governmental authority; and that discovery from a non-participant in the Swiss matter favors the application, with the burden on a party resisting discovery to show specifically how each request is overly broad or burdensome. UEFA relies on a supplemental declaration of its Swiss counsel, Andre Kurz; a 2024 Form 990 of FWC2026 US, Inc., which names FIFA as its sole member and lists FIFA (Americas), Inc. as a related organization controlled by FIFA; and FIFA Forward Enterprise member materials dated July 2026. It asks the court to grant the application and authorize the subpoenas. No ruling on the application.
• October 3, 2026. D. Colo.: FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc., FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries seeking to intervene, replied on October 1 in support of their motion. They argue that they have a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest under Rule 24(a), because UEFA’s discovery requests define FIFA to include its subsidiaries and affiliates and because UEFA sought discovery from them on the same facts in Florida. They also argue for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), saying their participation would cause no unnecessary delay because no briefing schedule has been set in Colorado. They ask the court to grant intervention and defer ruling on the application until the Southern District of Florida decides, or in the alternative to let them oppose the application on the same schedule as Respondents BANN Ventures, Inc. and Gregory B. Maffei. No ruling on the motion to intervene, the motion to defer, or the application.
• October 1, 2026. D. Colo.: UEFA opposed on September 25 the motion by Respondents BANN Ventures, Inc. and Gregory B. Maffei to defer ruling until the Southern District of Florida decides. UEFA says the request is in substance a stay and argues that a stay would not save judicial resources, because the Colorado court must rule under the law of its own circuit whatever Florida decides, and would not prevent inconsistent rulings, because the Florida respondents are different parties. It relies on Judge Vargas’s September 21 order in the J.P. Morgan case, which denied the same request for a stay on the same ground. UEFA does not oppose a briefing schedule like the one Judge Vargas set there (J.P. Morgan opposition due October 15, UEFA reply due October 29), but asks the court to require Maffei and BANN to put all objections, to the application and to the subpoenas, in one consolidated submission. UEFA says it proposed that to them and they declined. No ruling on the motion to defer, the motion to intervene, or the application.
• September 29, 2026. S.D. Fla.: Respondents FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. filed their response in opposition on September 28 and ask the court to deny UEFA’s application with prejudice. They do not ask for a stay or deferral. They argue that UEFA identifies no proceeding or investigation within the meaning of Section 1782, because no Swiss proceeding is underway, UEFA can only report suspected conduct to Swiss prosecutors, and only the prosecutor decides whether to open an investigation. They argue that the discovery is not for use before a foreign tribunal because the FIFA Statutes require UEFA to arbitrate disputes with FIFA and its officers, and arbitral bodies are not foreign or international tribunals under ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022). Relying on a declaration from their Swiss-law expert, Professor Alain Macaluso, they argue that UEFA is not an interested person because it would have no procedural rights in a Swiss criminal matter, and that any financial loss from the alleged mismanagement would fall on FIFA, not UEFA. On the discretionary factors they argue that Swiss prosecutors could seek the evidence themselves, including through a mutual legal assistance treaty, that the requests are unduly intrusive and burdensome, and that UEFA filed the application in bad faith and to harass. Under the September 9 order UEFA may reply within seven days of service of the response, which by count is October 5, 2026. No ruling on the application.
• September 22, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): Judge Jeannette A. Vargas ordered the JPMorgan parties to file their opposition to UEFA’s application by October 15, 2026, and UEFA to file its reply by October 29, 2026. The order does not rule on the application or the motion to intervene. Separately, on September 21 she denied the request by J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell to defer ruling on UEFA’s application until the Southern District of Florida resolves the application pending there. The court held that the party seeking a stay carries the burden of showing one is needed, and that neither ground the respondents offered met it: the court will have to decide the application before it under the law of the Second Circuit whatever the Florida court does, so a stay would not advance judicial economy, and the discovery targets in Florida are FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries, which are different parties from the respondents here. The order does not rule on UEFA’s application, on the motion to intervene, or on any question of Swiss law. In a separate order the same day, Judge Vargas disclosed that she served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York from October 2002 through November 2024, that UEFA’s counsel Rebecca Tinio was a colleague there, and that she maintains a social friendship with Ms. Tinio that includes dinners, social gatherings, and shared vacations; she stated that she has no particular or confidential knowledge of this matter, has never discussed it with Ms. Tinio and will not, and sees no basis for recusal at this time. Any party that wishes to move for recusal, or that has further information bearing on recusal, must file a letter by October 2, 2026.
• September 19, 2026. D. Colo.: Respondents Gregory B. Maffei and BANN Ventures, Inc., the two Colorado parties from whom UEFA seeks documents and deposition testimony, moved on September 18 to defer ruling on UEFA’s Section 1782 application. They did not oppose the motion to intervene by FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc., and asked the court to grant it. They argue that UEFA identifies no open Swiss criminal case, no pending Swiss investigation, and no decision by any Swiss authority, and that Section 1782 does not let a private entity use discovery in the United States to investigate whether it might later persuade foreign authorities to open a criminal matter. They ask the court to defer ruling until UEFA’s substantially identical Florida application is resolved, citing the Florida court’s September 9 order declining to require the respondents there to assert objections to subpoenas that have not been served. In the alternative they seek a coordinated briefing schedule and leave to file their own opposition by September 30, 2026. They also say their interests cannot be treated as adequately represented by the proposed intervenors, because the production and deposition burden falls on them. UEFA opposes the motion, and Judge Nina Y. Wang referred it to Magistrate Judge Timothy P. O’Hara the same day. No ruling on the motion to intervene, none on this motion, and none on the application.
• September 18, 2026. D. Colo.: UEFA opposed the motion to intervene by FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. on September 17. It argues that intervention as of right fails because the two subsidiaries assert their parent’s interest rather than a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest of their own, and that they act as an “improper proxy” for FIFA and Gianni Infantino, who have not appeared. It argues that any risk of duplicative production or inconsistent rulings with the Florida application is not a cognizable impairment, because each court applies the Intel framework independently and the subpoenas here run to BANN Ventures and Maffei, not to the subsidiaries. On permissive intervention it renews the objection it raised in New York to departing from the usual ex parte Section 1782 procedure, which it says would cause undue delay and prejudice. Counsel for Gregory B. Maffei and BANN Ventures, Inc. entered appearances the same day. No ruling on the motion to intervene and none on the application.
• September 17, 2026. S.D. Fla.: the court re-designated the case as a contested civil case, and the case number changed from 1:26-mc-25872 to 1:26-cv-25872. The August 31 order granting the respondents leave to oppose set their response date at September 28, 2026. UEFA then moved to clarify that order, and the respondents opposed. On September 9 the court granted that motion in part and denied it in part: UEFA may file a reply within seven days of service of the response, but the court declined to require the respondents to prematurely assert objections to subpoenas that have not been served and that UEFA concedes are drafts. No ruling on the application.
• September 16, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): UEFA answered the respondents’ letter motion on September 15. It argues that the respondents give no valid reason to grant FIFA U.S.’s motion to intervene, that this court need not defer to the Southern District of Florida because the Florida application is directed at different respondents, and that the respondents should not be allowed successive briefing that departs from the district’s usual ex parte procedure. On Intel’s fourth factor, which asks whether the discovery sought is unduly intrusive or burdensome, UEFA argues that opposing the merits and opposing the discovery are not two separate exercises and that splitting them would be artificial. Its position is that the respondents should object only if the court authorizes the subpoenas in whole or in part and the parties then cannot agree on scope. UEFA asks the court to “deny JPMorgan’s requests to unnecessarily depart from and prolong the usual ex parte Section 1782 procedure.” No ruling on any application.
• September 14, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): Respondents J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell filed a letter motion supporting FIFA U.S.’s motion to intervene and asking the court to defer ruling on UEFA’s Section 1782 application until the Southern District of Florida rules on UEFA’s parallel application against FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries. They argue that judicial economy favors deferral because both applications turn on the same two questions: whether the discovery is for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, which is a statutory requirement, and whether UEFA is circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions, which is Intel’s third factor. The respondents call the Swiss proceeding non-existent and say UEFA concedes it lacks authority to initiate it. In the alternative they ask leave to respond by September 30, and they ask not to be required to object to UEFA’s draft subpoenas unless the court first decides the subpoenas may issue. They are the first respondents outside the FIFA group to take a position in any of the four matters. The Thrive respondents appeared in the other New York case on August 31 without taking one, and the Colorado respondents have not appeared. Florida is unchanged on the public docket, and the only new Colorado entries are an appearance and a clerk’s notice. No ruling on any application.
• September 11, 2026. S.D.N.Y.: UEFA filed its oppositions to the intervention motions on September 10 in both the Thrive case and the J.P. Morgan case, which has been marked related and reassigned to Judge Vargas. UEFA argues that the district rules on Section 1782 applications ex parte and hears the served respondent on a motion to quash, that FIFA’s subsidiaries have no protectable interest of their own, and that neither FIFA nor Infantino has appeared. On the merits preview, UEFA says the statute reaches pre-accusation criminal investigations, that the court should not look into Swiss procedure, that no MLAT is required, and that the FIFA Statutes’ arbitration clause carves out matters that binding law sends to ordinary courts. Neither memorandum asserts that UEFA is a person suffering harm under Article 115 or will join as a private claimant under Article 118. UEFA distinguishes the 2014 district-court Certain Funds decision as one where “no procedural mechanism existed to submit materials to any foreign tribunal,” and calls its contemplated Article 301 report “a public-law reporting channel, not an arbitrable dispute in disguise.” Counsel for J.P. Morgan and its two executives appeared September 10. Florida and Colorado unchanged on the public docket. No ruling on any application.
• September 7, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (Thrive): a September 2 text-only order from Judge Vargas, which surfaced on the docket September 6, requires UEFA to respond to FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries’ motion to intervene by September 10. Both S.D.N.Y. dockets now share the September 10 response date. No ruling on the application.
• September 5, 2026. Page published. Four applications pending; no ruling in any court.
• September 3, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): Judge Subramanian orders UEFA to respond to FIFA (Americas)’s motion to intervene by September 10.
• September 1, 2026. FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. move to intervene in S.D.N.Y. (Thrive) and D. Colo., asking each court to defer until Florida rules or to permit an opposition by September 30; FIFA (Americas) moves to intervene in S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan).
• August 31, 2026. S.D. Fla.: the court grants the respondents leave to oppose; opposition due September 28.
• August 28, 2026. Fourth application filed in S.D.N.Y. against J.P. Morgan Securities, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell. In S.D. Fla., the respondents move for leave to oppose. In D. Colo., Judge Gallagher recuses; the case goes to Judge Wang and is referred to Magistrate Judge O’Hara.
• August 27, 2026. Applications filed in S.D. Fla., S.D.N.Y. (Thrive), and D. Colo.

For the full guide to Section 1782 practice, see Section 1782 Discovery: A Practical Guide to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.

How this page cites the filings

Page numbers are each filing’s own, not the court’s header page; the one exception is the Colorado application, which is cited by ECF page and says so. The “Thrive application” is UEFA’s application in S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-mc-00431 (docket entry 1). The “J.P. Morgan application” is UEFA’s application in S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-mc-00436 (docket entry 1), the “J.P. Morgan opposition” is the respondents’ October 15 memorandum in that case (docket entry 25), and the “Macaluso declaration” is the Swiss-law declaration filed with it (docket entry 26-1). The “Florida application” and the “Florida reply” are UEFA’s filings in S.D. Fla. No. 1:26-cv-25872 (docket entries 1 and 28), and the “Kurz declaration” is UEFA’s Swiss-law declaration of August 26, 2026, filed there with the application. The “Colorado application” is UEFA’s application in D. Colo. No. 1:26-mc-00158 (docket entry 1-2), and the “FIFA U.S. memorandum” is the September 1 intervention memorandum of FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries in the Thrive case (docket entry 15). UEFA’s account of the plan rests on these filings and on the press reports they cite. None of it has been tested in court.

Image credits

The photograph at the top of the page combines two photographs from Wikimedia Commons, one of Gianni Infantino (CC BY 2.0) and one of Aleksander Čeferin (CC BY-SA 4.0); its caption gives the full credits and links. Both were cropped and combined, with credit lines added, and the combined image is shared under CC BY-SA 4.0. The same image is used in the X thread on this case. The filing excerpts are from public court records, and each caption names the court, case number, docket entry, and page. The Statutes excerpt is from FIFA’s published Statutes, May 2024 edition. Highlighting on every excerpt was added for this page.