UEFA v. FIFA: Four Section 1782 Applications, Tracked

This page tracks the four applications the Union des Associations Européennes de Football has filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for discovery in aid of a criminal complaint it says it is preparing in Switzerland against Gianni Infantino, and possibly other FIFA officials, for criminal mismanagement under Article 158 of the Swiss Criminal Code. UEFA seeks documents and testimony from FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries, from the proposed investors in the withdrawn FIFA Forward Enterprise transaction, and from the bankers who valued it. Everything UEFA says about Infantino’s conduct is an allegation in a pending application. No one has been charged, and no court has ruled. I will update this page as the dockets move; the log is at the end.

Most press coverage counts three applications. There are four. The fourth, against J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and two of the bank’s executives, was filed in Manhattan a day after the other three. The filings matter for Section 1782 practice because they put the same ordinary questions before four courts at once: whether the statute reaches a criminal case nobody has filed, whether an applicant who is not the prosecutor is an "interested person," whether the evidence is "for use" in that case, and what a court does with an arbitration clause between the applicant and the target.

Where each application stands

The statute reaches a criminal case that has not been filed

Section 1782(a) authorizes a district court to order a person who "resides or is found" in the district to give testimony or produce documents "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation." That last clause carries the weight in these filings, because UEFA describes a complaint it is preparing rather than one it has filed.

The authority for the point deserves care. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), is the Supreme Court’s principal Section 1782 decision, but it arose from an antitrust complaint to the European Commission and did not decide the scope of the criminal-investigation clause. The clause stands on the statutory text, and in the Eleventh Circuit it stands on circuit precedent as well. In In re Furstenberg Fin. SAS v. Litai Assets LLC, 877 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2017), the court held that foreign criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation "are proceedings within the meaning of § 1782." That holding binds the Southern District of Florida, where one of the four applications is pending.

Proving reasonable contemplation

Intel requires only that a dispositive ruling be "within reasonable contemplation," and it rejected the view that the foreign proceeding must be "pending" or "imminent." Permissive is not the same as empty. A district court "is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so."

Two decisions issued on August 26, 2026, the day before UEFA filed, show what the standard asks for.

In In re Application of Biogen MA, Inc., No. 1:23-mc-00260 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2026), the court denied the respondent’s motion to vacate a Section 1782 order and quash the subpoena. On "for use," it held that an applicant "must provide reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time." The contemplated case was a patent infringement action in Italy, and the applicant had identified the patents, the cause of action, and the evidence it needed to meet Italian pleading requirements.

In In re Ex Parte Application of Allan Green, Candel & Partners, and Digital Innovations Holding, No. 1:26-mc-00166 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2026), Judge Furman granted an application for a contemplated French proceeding and then cut the discovery back substantially. Applying the Second Circuit’s standard, he required a "concrete basis from which [the court] can determine that the contemplated proceeding is more than just a twinkle in counsel’s eye," quoting In re Hornbeam Corp., 722 F. App’x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2018), which in turn quoted Certain Funds, Accounts &/or Investment Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2015). The contemplated proceeding grew out of a tender offer before the Autorité des Marchés Financiers, whose ruling may be appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal.

The Eleventh Circuit uses the same formulation. In Furstenberg it asked whether the applicants had produced "reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time," quoting Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA) Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014). Delaware, New York, and the Eleventh Circuit are asking one question in the same words.

The decisions point the same way. What converts a plan into a contemplated proceeding is a record: an identified forum, identified claims or charges, and a declaration from counsel qualified in that forum. The UEFA applications rest in part on a declaration of Swiss counsel dated August 26, 2026. For the contrast between a record that carries the burden and one that does not, see Reasonable Contemplation Under Section 1782: Two S.D.N.Y. Decisions, One Day Apart.

Measured against those decisions, reasonable contemplation is not UEFA’s hardest problem. The applications identify the charge, the forum, and Swiss counsel, and they attach a long factual record. The soft spot is that UEFA committed to no filing date. The Furstenberg applicants promised to file within forty-five days of receiving the discovery, and the Eleventh Circuit relied on that promise.

The harder question: "for use," and the two tiers of Swiss procedure

Section 1782 asks not only whether the evidence is relevant but whether the applicant can put it into the foreign case. Intel treated the complainant before the European Commission as an interested person because it had "the right to submit information" to the investigating authority and could "proceed to court if the Commission discontinues the investigation or dismisses the complaint." The participation rights did the work. In Certain Funds, Accounts &/or Investment Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit drew the line on the "for use" element and affirmed a denial: "Without some means of injecting the evidence into the proceeding, a § 1782 applicant cannot show that it has a role in the proceeding, such that it may ‘use’ the information." Furnishing information to someone who may or may not use it is not enough; the court likened it to "a witness approaching a prosecutor’s office claiming to have knowledge of a crime." That decision binds both New York courts. Furstenberg, which binds the Florida court, went the other way on facts that had the rights Intel cared about: the Luxembourg applicants could submit information to the investigating judge, and "any of the parties can appeal a decision not to proceed."

Whether UEFA has such a role is a question of Swiss procedure, and the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code has two tiers. Article 301(1) gives the first: "Any person is entitled to report an offence to a criminal justice authority." Article 301(3) states its limit: "A person making a report who has neither suffered loss nor injury nor is a private claimant has no further procedural rights." The second tier is the private claimant, a "person suffering harm," meaning one "whose rights have been directly violated by the offence" (Article 115(1)), who declares that it wishes to take part as a criminal or civil claimant (Article 118(1)); filing a criminal complaint counts as that declaration (Article 118(2)). A private claimant is a party (Article 104(1)), with the right to inspect the file, take part in procedural acts, comment, and "request that further evidence be taken" (Article 107(1)), to be heard before the investigation closes (Article 318(1)), and to contest a ruling abandoning the proceedings within ten days (Article 322(2)), a rule that also governs a no-proceedings order (Article 310(2)). A private claimant therefore holds exactly the rights Intel and Furstenberg relied on. A mere reporter holds none.

UEFA’s Swiss-law declaration claims the first tier. Paragraph 23 rests UEFA’s standing on Article 301(1) and states that the offense "is prosecuted ex officio irrespective of an application from an aggrieved person as defined by Article 115." Paragraph 25 adds that the targets and the charges "will not be decided by UEFA but by the competent Swiss public prosecutor." The declaration does not assert that UEFA is a person suffering harm under Article 115 or that UEFA will join as a private claimant under Article 118. I expect FIFA to argue that the party harmed under Article 158 is FIFA, whose assets were managed, and not UEFA, so that UEFA can never be more than a reporter.

The showing that would cure this is not hard to describe. In B&C KB Holding GmbH v. Goldberg Lindsay & Co., No. 23-1014 (2d Cir. June 26, 2024) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed a grant for an Austrian criminal investigation on an attestation that the prosecutor "will be obligated to consider any evidence submitted," and described "for use" as the applicant’s "practical ability to inject the requested information into a foreign proceeding." A supplemental declaration that either establishes UEFA’s status as a private claimant or establishes a comparable obligation on the Swiss prosecutor would change the New York cases. Absent it, the Eleventh Circuit line and the Second Circuit line point in opposite directions, and Florida is the friendlier forum for UEFA.

FIFA’s answer

FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries have not yet filed a merits opposition anywhere. Their intervention memoranda of September 1 preview five arguments. First, that UEFA "seeks discovery in aid of a foreign criminal proceeding that does not exist and that UEFA admittedly lacks the authority to initiate." That is the real fight, and as the last section shows, it is a question of Swiss law. Second, that "UEFA is contractually obligated to arbitrate any disputes with FIFA" under Article 51 of the FIFA Statutes, that Section 1782 cannot aid private arbitration after ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022), and that UEFA is repackaging an arbitral dispute as a criminal one. I take that up in the next section. Third, that Article 158 requires financial loss, that FIFA withdrew the proposal, and that the application is a "fishing expedition." That is a merits point for a Swiss prosecutor; U.S. courts do not decide the merits of the foreign claim, and I expect it to carry little weight on its own, though it returns in another form as the Article 115 question. Fourth, under Intel’s discretionary factors, that UEFA went to U.S. courts before approaching the Swiss authorities and that the applications, filed after UEFA alerted the press, are a "smear campaign." This is where the media-first filing may cost UEFA something, most likely in scope. Fifth, that the New York and Colorado courts should defer until Florida rules. I expect that to succeed in part. Florida will go first.

The arbitration clause FIFA relies on

FIFA’s memoranda cite Article 51 of the FIFA Statutes (May 2024 edition) but do not quote it. The article is titled "Obligations relating to dispute resolution." Its first paragraph requires confederations, member associations, and leagues to "recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority." Its second paragraph reads: "Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited." Article 49 has FIFA recognize the Court of Arbitration for Sport "to resolve disputes between FIFA, member associations, confederations, leagues, clubs, players, officials, football agents and match agents." Article 50 gives CAS jurisdiction over "appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies," lodged within 21 days, after internal channels are exhausted. Read together, these are a bar on ordinary courts and an appeal clause, not a broad agreement to arbitrate every disagreement.

Two problems follow. First, FIFA withdrew the proposal on August 1, 2026, before any vote of the member associations or the Council, so there is no final FIFA decision for UEFA to take to CAS under Article 50. Second, a criminal report to a Swiss prosecutor is not a dispute between FIFA and a confederation that CAS resolves. Article 301(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code lets any person report an offense, and the statutes of a private association do not take that right away. UEFA’s applications and its Swiss-law declaration do not mention arbitration or CAS at all.

What the clause gives FIFA is an argument about where this grievance belongs. Article 51 shows that UEFA agreed to keep its disputes with FIFA inside the football system, and a court may weigh that under Intel’s third factor when it asks whether UEFA is using Section 1782 to get around limits it accepted elsewhere. In Florida there is also a procedural route: courts in that district have held that a Section 1782 application is itself a "proceeding" under the Federal Arbitration Act, so a party bound by an arbitration clause that covers the dispute can be ordered to arbitrate and the discovery stayed, even after an ex parte grant. In re Application of Motransa, S.A., No. 1:19-mc-25026 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2020). That motion needs an agreement that covers the controversy before the court, and for the reasons above I doubt Article 51 does. In New York, B&C KB Holding is the closer precedent: an applicant in a pending arbitration filed a criminal complaint with Austrian prosecutors, the respondent called it a pretext, and the Second Circuit held that pretext goes to the court’s discretion and to use restrictions, not to the statutory "for use" element. The cure there was an order limiting use of the material in the arbitration, not a denial. I expect no court to deny or stay these applications on the arbitration clause alone.

Outlook

The most likely result is a split. In Florida, I expect Judge Martinez to grant the application in part because the Eleventh Circuit has already approved discovery for a planned foreign criminal complaint and the Florida respondents are FIFA’s own subsidiaries. The subpoenas would be narrowed to the five numbered document categories tied to the FFE proposal, and the open-ended deposition topics reaching "these and other related topics" and the date range running "through the date of production" would be cut back. In New York, I expect denial without prejudice unless UEFA’s September 10 filing shows a recognized right to put evidence before the Swiss prosecutor and to challenge a decision not to proceed. A denial on that ground would follow Certain Funds, which also allows a new application after "a significant change in circumstances," such as a Swiss complaint actually filed and UEFA’s status fixed. Colorado will wait for Florida and then follow it. The dates to watch are September 10 (UEFA’s response in the J.P. Morgan case), September 28 (FIFA’s opposition in Florida), and September 30 (the date by which FIFA asked to oppose in New York and Colorado if the courts do not defer).

Update, September 11, 2026. UEFA’s September 10 filings make its procedural argument the strongest ground it has in New York, and it may well win the intervention fight: the district does rule on these applications ex parte and hear the served respondent on a motion to quash, and FIFA’s subsidiaries are two steps removed from the Swiss target. But winning that motion only moves the "for use" question to the motion to quash, where Thrive, Kushner, and J.P. Morgan and its executives, all now represented, will make it. On that question the filings did not close the gap identified above. They defend the right to report and ask the court not to look into Swiss procedure, citing Mees; that is an argument about the merits of the foreign claim, not about whether UEFA has a role in the foreign case, and Certain Funds treats the role question as a statutory one the court must decide. Neither memorandum asserts that UEFA is a person suffering harm under Article 115, that it will join as a private claimant under Article 118, or that the Swiss prosecutor is obligated to consider what UEFA submits. UEFA distinguishes the 2014 district-court Certain Funds decision as one where "no procedural mechanism existed to submit materials to any foreign tribunal," without saying what mechanism it has beyond the Article 301 report. So the expectation stands: New York turns on whether UEFA can show a party’s rights in Switzerland, and it has so far chosen not to try.

On the arbitration clause, UEFA’s reading matches what this page said on September 5. Article 51 bars ordinary courts and recognizes CAS, and it carves out matters that binding legal provisions send to ordinary courts; UEFA calls its contemplated Article 301 report "a public-law reporting channel, not an arbitrable dispute in disguise." I expect that argument to fail for FIFA. Florida’s opposition remains due September 28, and Colorado’s intervention motion is with the magistrate judge.

Updates

• September 17, 2026. S.D. Fla.: the court re-designated the case as a contested civil case, and the case number changed from 1:26-mc-25872 to 1:26-cv-25872. The August 31 order granting the respondents leave to oppose set their response date at September 28, 2026. UEFA then moved to clarify that order, and the respondents opposed. On September 9 the court granted that motion in part and denied it in part: UEFA may file a reply within seven days of service of the response, but the court declined to require the respondents to prematurely assert objections to subpoenas that have not been served and that UEFA concedes are drafts. No ruling on the application.
• September 16, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): UEFA answered the respondents’ letter motion on September 15. It argues that the respondents give no valid reason to grant FIFA U.S.’s motion to intervene, that this court need not defer to the Southern District of Florida because the Florida application is directed at different respondents, and that the respondents should not be allowed successive briefing that departs from the district’s usual ex parte procedure. On Intel’s fourth factor, which asks whether the discovery sought is unduly intrusive or burdensome, UEFA argues that opposing the merits and opposing the discovery are not two separate exercises and that splitting them would be artificial. Its position is that the respondents should object only if the court authorizes the subpoenas in whole or in part and the parties then cannot agree on scope. UEFA asks the court to “deny JPMorgan’s requests to unnecessarily depart from and prolong the usual ex parte Section 1782 procedure.” No ruling on any application.
• September 14, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): Respondents J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell filed a letter motion supporting FIFA U.S.’s motion to intervene and asking the court to defer ruling on UEFA’s Section 1782 application until the Southern District of Florida rules on UEFA’s parallel application against FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries. They argue that judicial economy favors deferral because both applications turn on the same two questions: whether the discovery is for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, which is a statutory requirement, and whether UEFA is circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions, which is Intel’s third factor. The respondents call the Swiss proceeding non-existent and say UEFA concedes it lacks authority to initiate it. In the alternative they ask leave to respond by September 30, and they ask not to be required to object to UEFA’s draft subpoenas unless the court first decides the subpoenas may issue. They are the first respondents outside the FIFA group to take a position in any of the four matters. The Thrive respondents appeared in the other New York case on August 31 without taking one, and the Colorado respondents have not appeared. Florida is unchanged on the public docket, and the only new Colorado entries are an appearance and a clerk’s notice. No ruling on any application.
• September 11, 2026. S.D.N.Y.: UEFA filed its oppositions to the intervention motions on September 10 in both the Thrive case and the J.P. Morgan case, which has been marked related and reassigned to Judge Vargas. UEFA argues that the district rules on Section 1782 applications ex parte and hears the served respondent on a motion to quash, that FIFA’s subsidiaries have no protectable interest of their own, and that neither FIFA nor Infantino has appeared. On the merits preview, UEFA says the statute reaches pre-accusation criminal investigations, that the court should not look into Swiss procedure, that no MLAT is required, and that the FIFA Statutes’ arbitration clause carves out matters that binding law sends to ordinary courts. Neither memorandum asserts that UEFA is a person suffering harm under Article 115 or will join as a private claimant under Article 118. Counsel for J.P. Morgan and its two executives appeared September 10. Florida and Colorado unchanged on the public docket. No ruling on any application.
• September 7, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (Thrive): a September 2 text-only order from Judge Vargas, which surfaced on the docket September 6, requires UEFA to respond to FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries’ motion to intervene by September 10. Both S.D.N.Y. dockets now share the September 10 response date. No ruling on the application.
• September 5, 2026. Page published. Four applications pending; no ruling in any court.
• September 3, 2026. S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan): Judge Subramanian orders UEFA to respond to FIFA (Americas)’s motion to intervene by September 10.
• September 1, 2026. FIFA (Americas), Inc. and FWC2026 US, Inc. move to intervene in S.D.N.Y. (Thrive) and D. Colo., asking each court to defer until Florida rules or to permit an opposition by September 30; FIFA (Americas) moves to intervene in S.D.N.Y. (J.P. Morgan).
• August 31, 2026. S.D. Fla.: the court grants the respondents leave to oppose; opposition due September 28.
• August 28, 2026. Fourth application filed in S.D.N.Y. against J.P. Morgan Securities, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Mary Callahan Erdoes, and Eric Menell. In S.D. Fla., the respondents move for leave to oppose. In D. Colo., Judge Gallagher recuses; the case goes to Judge Wang and is referred to Magistrate Judge O’Hara.
• August 27, 2026. Applications filed in S.D. Fla., S.D.N.Y. (Thrive), and D. Colo.

For the full guide to Section 1782 practice, see Section 1782 Discovery: A Practical Guide to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.