Section 1782 Discovery: A Practical Guide to 28 U.S.C. § 1782

Q: Can Section 1782 be used for a foreign arbitration?

Generally no. After ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022), a private foreign arbitration is not a qualifying "tribunal." Discovery can be used in an arbitration only if that use is secondary or ancillary to a primary acceptable use in a qualifying tribunal, and such a secondary use may be conditioned in some way.

Section 1782 of the United States Code (Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals) allows a foreign tribunal, litigant (or other interested person) to obtain evidence from persons found in the United States for use in a foreign proceeding. Used correctly, this can be a powerful and strategic tool.

Almost every aspect of the statute has been litigated. The key Supreme Court opinion on the interpretation of Section 1782 is Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). The meaning of some provisions is well-settled, but others may be unclear or counterintuitive. An application has four mandatory statutory requirements and four discretionary elements. Courts "evaluate discovery requests under section 1782 in light of the statute's twin aims of providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts." Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1097 (2d Cir. 1995).

Key takeaways

Section 1782 lets a foreign tribunal, a litigant, or another interested person obtain evidence from a person found in the United States for use in a proceeding abroad.
An application must satisfy four mandatory statutory requirements and then survive four discretionary factors drawn from Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
A private foreign arbitration generally does not qualify after ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022); the tribunal must be governmental or intergovernmental.
The foreign proceeding need not be pending; it may be "within reasonable contemplation," but it must be more than speculative.
Applications are frequently filed and granted ex parte, and in the busiest districts (S.D.N.Y., S.D. Fla., N.D. Cal.) they are often decided in days or weeks.

The four statutory requirements and the four discretionary factors

What an application must satisfy (left), and what the court then weighs in its discretion (right).
Mandatory statutory requirements	Discretionary Intel factors
The person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district.	Whether the respondent is a participant in the foreign proceeding.
The evidence is "for use" in the foreign proceeding.	The nature of the foreign tribunal and its receptivity to Section 1782 assistance.
The proceeding is before a foreign or international tribunal and is adjudicative in nature.	Whether the request circumvents foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies.
The application is made by an interested person.	Whether the discovery sought is unduly burdensome.

Bringing the application

The Application

A Section 1782 petition or application is filed in the federal district court in which the person from whom discovery is sought can be found. (Practice note: do not choose a civil action but miscellaneous on the civil cover sheet. This is akin to subpoena enforcement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.) If discovery is sought from more than one person and they are found in different districts, a separate application for each one is required. This may lead to inconsistent rulings. The Application may be filed pro se (even in forma pauperis), but this rarely prospers. Typically, an Application is supported by one or more declarations (under 28 U.S. Code § 1746), at least one of which is by an attorney representing the petitioner in the foreign proceeding who explains the relevance of the discovery being sought and how the materials obtained may be used (or "injected") into the foreign proceeding. Often the petitioner also submits a declaration laying out the relevant background facts. In addition, it is best practice for the Application to include the discovery to be propounded in the form of a draft subpoena. (Another practice note: the Application or parts of it may be filed under seal under appropriate circumstances.)

Ex parte

In a departure from the normal adversary process, Applications are often filed and granted ex parte. Courts may require service of the Application upon the adversary party in the foreign proceeding in addition to the discovery target in the United States to allow them to oppose the Application. See, e.g., In re Eshelman, No. 5:23-MC-80015 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2023) ("The target of the § 1782 Application, Google LLC, has filed a response in this matter, indicating that it does not oppose issuance of the subpoenas [but] requests that the Court include in its § 1782 order a requirement for Google to provide notice to the accountholder in question and to permit both Google and the accountholder 30 days after service to file a motion to quash or modify the subpoenas."). The duty of candor towards the court is heightened in ex parte proceedings. In re Application of Vestolit, No. MC 24-CV-01401 at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2025) the court temporarily denied an otherwise valid application because it did not sufficiently identify one of the subpoena targets and ordered "each of the seven lawyers whose name appears on the Application and on the memorandum filed in support of the Application" to show cause why that lawyer should not be deemed to have violated Model Rule 3.3(d).

The Court

The Application is filed in U.S. District Court. In districts where applications are common (S.D.N.Y.; S.D. Fla.; N.D. Cal.), the turnaround may be in days or weeks, and they are often granted when they are facially sufficient. The granting of an Application is vested in the court's discretion. Many courts will refer Applications to Magistrate Judges for a ruling. See In re Matter of the B&C Holding GmbH, Civil Action No. 23-365-JWD-EWD (M.D. La. Nov. 24, 2023) ("A § 1782 application is not among the pretrial matters specifically excluded from direct ruling by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Additionally, as a § 1782 application is a discovery tool, it does not appear to be a dispositive matter which would require a report and recommendation."). In other districts, a Magistrate Judge will issue a Report and Recommendation only. See In re Spear Ltd., No. 1:24-mc-12842 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2026) (magistrate judge issuing a report and recommendation on a Section 1782 application). An order by the district court granting or denying an Application is immediately appealable, as long as the scope of discovery is conclusively determined from the record, In re Amgen Inc., No. 25-1407, 139 F.4th 265, 2025 WL 1585165 (3d Cir. June 5, 2025) ("[t]he lack of a conclusive determination as to the scope of [a party's] discovery obligations renders any § 1782 order nonfinal and unappealable"), as can be orders for protective orders or to quash that would be considered interlocutory in other contexts. Most circuits treat a Section 1782 ruling as a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because once the application is decided there is no further case or controversy before the district court. CPC Patent Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 34 F.4th 801 (9th Cir. 2022). On appeal, the court reviews the district court's interpretation of the statutory requirements de novo and its discretionary decision to grant or deny assistance for abuse of discretion. Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 2015). A losing respondent may also seek to stay the discovery pending appeal, but must satisfy the ordinary four-factor stay standard and make a strong showing of likely success on the merits—a demanding burden, because the court's weighing of the Intel factors is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. PedalPoint Holdings, LLC v. Youngpoong Corp., No. 1:25-mc-00194 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025) (denying a stay pending appeal of a Section 1782 discovery order where the respondents showed neither a substantial likelihood of success nor that the balance of harms favored a stay—any injury being mitigated by a protective order—but granting a one-week administrative stay to allow them to seek a stay from the Second Circuit). The Second Circuit later affirmed the underlying discovery orders. Youngpoong Corp. v. PedalPoint Holdings, No. 25-3100 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2026) (affirming the Section 1782 discovery orders and the denial of PedalPoint's motion to quash, reviewed for abuse of discretion, and holding that a court should allow discovery where the record does not establish a foreign-law privilege rather than resolve the question on "noncommittal" expert affidavits). Nor is the appeal mooted by the very production the appellant tried to prevent: a court of appeals can still order the documents returned or destroyed, or enjoin their use, so a Section 1782 discovery ruling remains reviewable even after the material changes hands. In re Renco Group, Inc., No. 24-13266 (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (holding a Section 1782 appeal not moot despite disgorgement of the documents, and reviewing the district court's discovery and privilege rulings for abuse of discretion). Whether a magistrate judge may decide an application by order or only by report and recommendation turns on whether the application is "dispositive," a point on which courts divide. (See Circuit splits, below.)

The Statutory Factors

The Person

The person from whom discovery is sought may be an individual or an organization.

Is found

Courts have interpreted this requirement to mean the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. An organization is found where the business is incorporated, is headquartered, or where it has a principal place of business. An organization may be subject to general or specific jurisdiction. See In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 530 (2d Cir. 2019) ("Translated to account for a § 1782 respondent's nonparty status, we thus hold that, where the discovery material sought proximately resulted from the respondent's forum contacts, that would be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction for ordering discovery. That is, the respondent's having purposefully availed itself of the forum must be the primary or proximate reason that the evidence sought is available at all."). If a person "is served with a subpoena while physically present in the district of the court that issued the discovery order, then for purposes of § 1782(a), he is 'found' in that district." In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2002). For a good discussion of the necessary showing for a foreigner who visits or stays in the United States to be "found" in the district see In re Application of William Laggner, Civil Action No. 23-mc-00074 (D. Colo. Jan. 11, 2024). If discovery is sought from persons found in multiple districts, correspondingly multiple applications are required. In some circumstances, the latter-filed actions may be stayed or dismissed if they are largely duplicative. See, e.g., In re Elliott Cap. Advisors, L.P., No. 4:16-MC-00030-SMR, 2016 WL 11974977 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 18, 2016) (collecting cases). (The circuits disagree about how far "found" extends; see Circuit splits, below.)

Civil or criminal

The proceeding may be civil, criminal, administrative, or quasi-judicial. Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980). Examples of non-obvious "tribunals" include the Mexican Federal Commission for Protection Against Health Risks (Comisión Federal Para La Protección Contra Riesgos Sanitarios, "COFEPRIS"). El Poder del Consumidor v. The Coca-Cola Company, No. 1:24-CV-03665 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2024) ("COFEPRIS is an administrative agency with authority to investigate public-health complaints in the first instance, take and receive relevant evidence, and issue resolutions deciding all issues presented. Plus, its resolutions are subject to judicial appeal."). A foreign criminal investigation also qualifies, and a complainant who can trigger or join it may be an interested person. See also In re Telf AG, No. 1:26-mc-23586 (S.D. Fla. May 21, 2026) (granting in part an application by a Swiss private prosecutor to subpoena a Florida resident for use in a Swiss criminal investigation into an alleged defamation and extortion campaign).

See also In re Application of Raykhelson, No. 1:25-mc-00427 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2026) (recommending that an application by the accused in a Russian criminal fraud proceeding to subpoena sixteen financial institutions be granted, noting the applicant's status as a fugitive from those proceedings without treating it as a bar, and reaffirming the "consensus view among U.S. courts" that Russian tribunals are generally receptive to discovery obtained through Section 1782), adopted, No. 1:25-mc-00427 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2026).

A proceeding in a tribunal

In practice, this means not an arbitration, ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619, 633 (2022), and not an enforcement agency. That bar extends to treaty-based investor-state arbitration: the Second Circuit has held that an arbitration before an ICSID tribunal is not a qualifying "foreign or international tribunal" after ZF Automotive, because such a panel does not exercise governmental or intergovernmental authority. Webuild v. WSP USA Inc., 108 F.4th 138 (2d Cir. 2024). (On the now-resolved circuit split over private commercial arbitration, see Circuit splits, below.) The proceeding must be adjudicative in nature. See In re Banco BTG Pactual, No. 24 MISC. 304 (AT), 2025 WL 1079221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2025) (discussing challenge to application because foreign proceeding was essentially "enforcement proceedings related to debt [that] already exist[s]" and involve no "merit-based issue that remains to be decided."). Discovery can be used in an arbitration, however, if that use is secondary or ancillary to a primary acceptable use in the tribunal. Such a secondary use may be conditioned in some way. The proceeding may be existing or be "within reasonable contemplation." If the application indicates that the discovery it seeks is necessary to determine whether a claim in a foreign proceeding may be brought in the first place, it will likely be denied. In re Novalpina, No. 23 MISC. 25, 2025 WL 1160854, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2025). Courts are divided as to whether a foreign proceeding is "within reasonable contemplation" where a petitioner represents that it will bring a foreign proceeding—and articulates legal theories on which it allegedly plans to rely—while simultaneously stating that the filing of the contemplated foreign claims is contingent on obtaining the Section 1782 discovery that is sought. In re Novalpina. The Second Circuit polices this line at both ends. It requires "some objective indicium that the action is being contemplated," and has affirmed Section 1782 discovery for litigation not yet commenced where that indicium was present. In re Orthogen International GmbH, No. 25-1253(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (rejecting the argument that Section 1782 reaches only "pending" or "imminent" proceedings, and affirming discovery for contemplated German litigation). But it has affirmed quashing subpoenas and vacating a prior grant where the applicant's only use was speculative—arising solely if she chose to appeal an already-concluded foreign trial—because such use "depends on some intervening event[s] or decision[s]." In re Application of Guryeva-Motlokhov, No. 25-1626-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2026) (requiring "reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time"). A judicial proceeding to enforce a judgment, In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007), or an arbitral award is a valid proceeding.

For use

Evidence is "for use" in a foreign proceeding if it can "be employed with some advantage or serve some use in [that] proceeding." Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 2015). Therefore, the applicant must demonstrate the "practical ability to inject the requested information into the foreign proceeding." An applicant may satisfy the statute's "for use" requirement even if the discovery sought is not necessary to succeed in the foreign proceeding. Nor must the evidence be discoverable under the law that governs the foreign proceeding; the Supreme Court held that Section 1782 contains no foreign-discoverability requirement. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004). The discovery need not be sought for the purpose of commencing a foreign proceeding in order to be "for use" in that proceeding, so long as the proceeding is within "reasonable contemplation." A § 1782 applicant satisfies the statute's "for use" requirement by showing that the materials are to be used at some stage of a foreign proceeding. Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 2015). If the matter is criminal, discovery is available to a defendant or to a complainant who may trigger a criminal action. "The future proceedings must be more than speculative, however, and a 'district court must insist on reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time.'" Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014). The term of art is "within reasonable contemplation." See In re Application of CETTEEN, No. 2:24-MC-00228, 2025 WL 1663707, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 3, 2025) (denying application as "bare assertion that it is 'contemplating' misappropriation claims is insufficient."). Materials may be for use in a foreign proceeding as well as a domestic one. See In re Application of Philippe Martinez, No. 24-MC-00306 (RA)(SN), 2024 WL 5402058, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2024) ("the law does not prohibit the Applicants from using evidence obtained in these proceedings in the Florida RICO Action, unless the Middle District of Florida orders otherwise."). They may be used in multiple proceedings. In re Application of Novo Nordisk, No. 7:25-MC-1-M-BM, 2025 WL 1448204 (E.D.N.C. May 20, 2025). See also In re MKH, Inc., No. 4:26-mc-80095 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2026) (treating a forthcoming Tokyo District Court action as within reasonable contemplation and granting an ex parte application by a copyright owner to subpoena Cloudflare to identify the operators of allegedly infringing websites).

Denial on the basis that the discovery is not "for use" examples: discovery requested to assist in trial preparation, see In re DNG, Case No. 23 Misc. 435 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2024) ("DNG has repeatedly stated that its intended 'use' for the proposed U.S. deposition of Mulanaphy would be to assist in its trial preparation... DNG does not argue that the deposition itself would be admissible in the Singapore trial. Nor does it argue that the deposition would be taken in the service of pretrial procedures authorized by Singapore law."); if the foreign action has been dismissed during the pendency of the Application, HateAid gGmbH v. Twitter Int'l Unlimited Co., No. 23-MC-80235-HSG (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2024).

By an interested person

A Section 1782 order may be granted only “upon the application of any interested person.” 28 U.S.C. 1782. The term “interested person” has been given “expansive definition.” see Certain Funds, Accts. &/or Inv. Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2015). Still, it is not infinitely elastic. “[T]he ability simply to pass on information to parties in a proceeding, without more, cannot confer ‘interested person’ status any more than the ability of amicus counsel to pass along evidence and arguments to counsel representing one of the parties in litigation.” See In re Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P., No. 24-MC-533 (LJL), 2025 WL 2733450, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025).

Receptive

Absent specific directions to the contrary from a foreign forum, the statute's underlying policy should generally prompt district courts to provide some form of discovery assistance, and courts should deny discovery on the basis of a lack of receptiveness only where it is provided with "authoritative proof that the foreign tribunal would reject evidence" obtained with the aid of Section 1782. In re Atvos Agroindustrial Investimentos S.A., 481 F. Supp. 3d 166, 176-177 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Countries found to be receptive include Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Curacao, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, England, France, the General Court of the European Union, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Scope of discovery

The general rule is that discovery under Section 1782 may be obtained under the rules and principles guiding discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Tokyo Dist. Prosecutors Off., Tokyo, Japan, 16 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1994). This may include the production of documents not physically present in the United States, as long as the person from whom discovery is sought has the necessary "possession, custody, or control" over them. But that control must be proven: a parent need not produce records its foreign subsidiary holds unless the subpoenaed party has the legal right, authority, or practical ability to obtain them on demand. In re Application of CRC Liquid Strategies Fund, LP, No. 1:25-mc-00264 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (denying a motion to compel Citigroup to produce records held by its Mexican subsidiary Banamex, because majority ownership and high-level legal and compliance oversight did not establish the requisite control under the four-factor parent-subsidiary test, and the burden of showing control rests on the party seeking discovery).

Privilege

A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any "legally applicable privilege" under U.S. law, or the law of the jurisdiction in which the discovery is to be used. In some circuits, courts will require "authoritative proof" that the privilege would apply in the foreign tribunal. See In re Arida, LLC, No. 19-MC-522 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021) (collecting cases); In re Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A., No. 23-2200, 126 F.4th 926, 2025 WL 259981, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) ("In line with the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, we agree that the party asserting a foreign privilege bears the burden of establishing that privilege... But we need not, for purposes of this case, adopt the Second and Fifth Circuit's 'authoritative proof' standard."). The "person" from whom discovery is sought may be an attorney or law firm and can be compelled to provide non-privileged records in their possession, custody, or control. See, e.g., In re Ex Parte Michelena, Case No. 1:21-mc-20289 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 14, 2021) ("Applicants assert that they are entitled to the information being sought as heirs to the Deceased, an assertion that Akerman fails to dispute in its Reply. In the Application, it is further explained that a majority of the documents and information being sought 'relates to ... account statements and other financial records that do not constitute attorney-client communications.' Akerman likewise fails to address or dispute this proffer."); In re SBK Art LLC, No. 24 MISC. 147, 2025 WL 1537474 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025) (authorizing petitioner to obtain discovery from law firm, "but only within tightly defined parameters."). See also Kuwait Ports Authority v. Crowell & Moring LLP, No. 1:22-mc-00064 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025) (largely denying a law firm's motion to quash subpoenas for its files concerning a Cayman fund, holding that the fiduciary-beneficiary exception overcame both attorney-client privilege and work-product protection because the petitioner limited partners showed good cause, and that the rule limiting depositions of opposing counsel did not apply because the firm was not trial counsel in the foreign litigation). But discovery from counsel has limits: a court may abuse its discretion by ordering a U.S. law firm to produce a foreign client's documents that would not be discoverable abroad and are in the firm's hands solely because they were sent to the United States for American litigation. See Kiobel v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2018) (reversing a § 1782 order against U.S. counsel where the documents were covered by a confidentiality order and the request sought to circumvent more restrictive foreign discovery). The Second Circuit has since made clear that limit is narrow. In re Ex Parte Application of SBK Art LLC, No. 25-1563-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (affirming an order granting Section 1782 discovery from a U.S. law firm without any finding that the documents were obtainable from its foreign client abroad, and holding that Kiobel erects no categorical bar—its result rested on the Intel weighing and a confidentiality order—while undue-burden and attorney-client objections are for the post-grant Rule 26 stage, not the gate). A party asserting privilege or work product over subpoenaed materials must also carry its burden the right way. In re Renco Group, Inc., No. 24-13266 (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (affirming the denial of a protective order where the intervening law firms' privilege log was deficient, and holding that a privilege or work-product claim must be substantiated document-by-document—blanket assertions will not do, and a court need not conduct in camera review or hold a hearing until the asserting party makes that individualized showing—and that ordinary business records such as third-party vendor receipts are not work product absent a litigation-driven primary purpose). On the unsettled standard for foreign privilege, see Circuit splits, below.

Misc

The court may allow a deposition to be conducted under the rules of the tribunal where the discovery is to be used instead of the default Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery may be conditioned upon the indemnification by the party seeking discovery of the person from whom discovery is sought if the disclosure would lead the person to incur a fine. A recalcitrant discovery target is subject to civil contempt and fines for noncompliance. For example, see In re Application of LM Property Development, No. 22-CV-62185 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2024) ("More specifically, the undersigned recommends that: (i) Respondent continue to be held in civil contempt; (ii) Respondent's daily fine for noncompliance be increased; and (iii) Petitioners be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion").

Discovery obtained under Section 1782 is generally confined to the purposes described in the application, and a court may police how the materials are later used. Section 1782 does not itself restrict how lawfully obtained discovery may be used; rather, the district court's discretionary authority — principally the protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) — supplies the mechanism for any such limitation. Accent Delight Int'l Ltd. v. Adelson, 869 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2017). See In re Salinas Pliego, No. 1:24-mc-00394 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2026) (denying an intervenor's motion to enjoin the allegedly unauthorized use of records obtained under Section 1782, where the court's prior order had not in fact restricted the challenged use). See also In re Tofoni, No. 4:25-cv-00313 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2026) (entering a protective order confining the subpoenaed bank records to the Argentine breach-of-contract action named in the petition and, notably, barring those materials from being uploaded to any open generative artificial-intelligence tool).

Defense

A subpoena target may challenge the sufficiency of the Application itself, move to quash or modify the subpoena, or for a protective order as under F.R.C.P. 45, or some combination. In addition, an interested person (for example, an adversary party in the jurisdiction in which the discovery may be used) may intervene to challenge the Application. In re Saul Klein, No. 23 MISC. 211 (PAE) at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) ("The Court initially granted, as facially supported, Saul's ex parte application under § 1782 for authority to issue subpoenas duces tecum to the U.S. institutions. Now before the Court are two motions to quash those subpoenas. One is from Michael and entities he and Eva own and control (together, 'the first movants')."). See also In re Beldi, No. 1:24-mc-00421 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026) (adopting a report and recommendation and denying intervenors' motion to vacate and quash subpoenas issued in aid of a Brazilian probate proceeding, and distinguishing In re Saul Klein because the bank records sought did not, in substance, belong to the movants); In re Shchegoleva, No. 1:25-cv-23858 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2026) (recommending that the target of the discovery be permitted to intervene as of right to oppose an ex parte application aimed at his finances for use in a foreign divorce), adopted (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2026). Any such intervention must be timely. See In re Martinez, 736 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1200 (S.D. Fla. 2024); In re Application of Zarzur, No. 22 MISC. 348, 2025 WL 1101475, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2025) (affirming R&R holding that one year delay made intervention untimely). It may also be pseudonymous. In re Exchange Union Co., No. 24-MC-91645-ADB, 2025 WL 894652 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2025). In proper cases, a Respondent may receive reciprocal discovery to maintain "procedural parity" between the parties in the foreign proceeding. See, e.g., In re Application of Genial, No. 24-MC-348 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025). See also In re Application of Raykhelson, No. 1:25-mc-00427 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2026) (granting the alleged victim of the foreign crime reciprocal discovery of the same financial records obtained by the applicant, and denying that victim's motion to intervene as unnecessary because the reciprocal-discovery order already secured procedural parity). An application has been denied as an attempt to circumvent mandatory arbitration. See Sanchez v. Adverit, No. 25-CV-21144, 2025 WL 2171607, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2025).

The discretionary (Intel) factors

Even if all statutory factors are met, a district court may deny an application based on its evaluation of the discretionary factors. See, e.g., In re Application of Quadre, No. 24-MC-1341-MMP, 2025 WL 502054, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) ("[E]ven where an applicant satisfies § 1782's statutory prerequisites, the district court still retains substantial discretion to permit or deny the requested discovery.").

First discretionary factor: whether the respondent is a participant in the foreign proceeding

This factor is important because § 1782 assistance is more likely to be justified when the discovery target is a nonparticipant and thus more likely to be outside the foreign tribunal's reach. In other words, the availability of evidence—not the target's participation per se—is the key. See, e.g., In re Macquarie Bank Ltd., No. 2:14-cv-00797, 2015 WL 3439103, at *6 (D. Nev. May 28, 2015) ("Although the case law at times refers to whether the 'person' is within the foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach, the key issue is whether the material is obtainable through the foreign proceeding.").

Conversely, this factor can cut against discovery aimed at a domestic affiliate of a foreign party. Meyer v. Ginkgo Bioworks Holding Inc., No. 1:25-mc-91551 (D. Mass. June 5, 2026) (vacating a prior ex parte order and quashing the subpoena in part, and explaining that a court must "look beyond the parties actually named in the petition to determine whether the party from whom documents are sought is the 'real party' in interest"; discovery was not warranted for materials the respondent's foreign subsidiary could itself provide to the Swiss court if directed to do so, nor for the respondent's internal communications and deliberations of which that subsidiary was unaware).

The factor likewise defeats discovery a party could have obtained from its adversary in the foreign forum itself. Leguide.com SAS v. Google LLC, No. 1:21-mc-00219 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2025) (reviewing de novo and affirming the denial of an application, and explaining, per SPS Corp. I v. GM Co., 110 F.4th 586 (3d Cir. 2024), that evidence is "unobtainable" abroad only when it lies outside the foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach, not when it is unavailable because of the applicant's "repeated litigation defeats"; the respondents were parties to the French proceeding and had already refused the same discovery there, which also weighed against the applicant on the circumvention factor).

Second discretionary factor: the nature of the foreign tribunal and its receptivity to § 1782 assistance

The idea is to provide help where reasonably appropriate, without imposing or creating profitless work. An Applicant who seeks to inject evidence at an appellate stage must explain how such evidence could be received in the judicial process. In re Green Dev. Corp. S.A. de C.V., No. WDQ-15-2985 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2015), for example, the court recommended denial of a petition in part because there was "no evidence that Petitioner has indicated to the Honduran court its purported need for the information sought. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Honduran court would be receptive to the introduction of new information during its appellate review of Petitioner's case pending before it."

Conversely, a foreign court's own handling of the same discovery can supply the "affirmative evidence" of non-receptivity that the second factor demands. In re Application of Vestolit, No. MC 24-CV-01401 (D. Del. Nov. 24, 2025) (vacating the order and quashing the subpoena where all four Intel factors favored the respondent: the documents were reachable through the Dutch proceeding, the Dutch court had already denied overlapping requests and branded them "a fishing expedition," and the applicant filed here while its Dutch disclosure motion was pending—without informing the Dutch court—after declining discovery offered there).

Third discretionary factor: Circumvention of Foreign Proof-Gathering Restrictions or Other Policies

The evaluation of this factor may be quite detail- and fact-intensive. For example: "There is no suggestion that Petitioner is looking to bypass Mexican evidentiary restrictions. At the same time, however, there are some procedural red flags that give the undersigned pause. First, Petitioner is seeking information and testimony regarding Coca-Cola's Mexican subsidiaries, but Petitioner has failed—conspicuously, in the undersigned's view—to include these entities in its administrative complaint. Second, Petitioner filed its § 1782 application in this Court just twelve days after filing the administrative complaint. Third, Petitioner concedes that COFEPRIS has authority to request evidence directly from Coca-Cola's Mexican subsidiaries and, what's more, that it even has its own right to ask COFEPRIS to make such evidentiary requests. Yet rather than allowing COFEPRIS to take the lead, or nudging it to do so, Petitioner instead decided to quickly file the instant application seeking this Court's assistance. Meanwhile, there is no sign that COFEPRIS itself has requested any of the proposed discovery. To be sure, as Petitioner points out, there is no exhaustion requirement under § 1782. In other words, Petitioner was not required to first seek discovery through COFEPRIS before coming to this Court. At the same time, however, the omission of Coca-Cola's Mexican subsidiaries from the administrative complaint, the speed with which Petitioner arrived in this Court, the fact that Petitioner hasn't asked COFEPRIS to obtain any of the proposed discovery, and finally, the lack of action by COFEPRIS collectively suggest that Petitioner may be trying to circumvent the agency's investigative autonomy." El Poder del Consumidor v. The Coca-Cola Company, No. 1:24-CV-03665 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2024). Differently stated, "a perception that an applicant has side-stepped less-than-favorable discovery rules by resorting immediately to § 1782 can be a factor in a court's analysis."

A contractual choice of forum can also bear on this factor. Meyer v. Ginkgo Bioworks Holding Inc., No. 1:25-mc-91551 (D. Mass. June 5, 2026) (treating Swiss forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses as reflecting the parties' understanding that their disputes would be resolved under Swiss adjudicatory procedure, including its narrower discovery, so that broad Section 1782 discovery would let the petitioner benefit from a process he had "bargained away").

A forum-selection clause is not always decisive, however. In re Application of Orthogen International GmbH, No. 1:23-mc-00152 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2026) (declining to quash or stay where a German forum-selection clause was "merely a factor in the Section 1782 analysis and not dispositive," and rejecting the respondents' "parity" objection—that Section 1782 affords a foreign litigant pre-suit discovery it could not obtain domestically under Rule 27—on the ground that the two provisions serve different aims), aff'd, In re Orthogen International GmbH, No. 25-1253(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (a forum-selection clause is a discretionary factor, not an absolute bar to Section 1782 discovery).

The fourth factor: Discovery Burden

This factor is in practical terms coextensive with the standard undue burden analysis that is evaluated in Federal discovery under Rule 26(b)(1).

Uses

Section 1782 applications have commonly been used to discover the identity of anonymous or pseudonymous posters; in probate and divorce cases; for business disputes, fraud, embezzlement; in aid of bankruptcy and receiverships; for patent infringement; to help enforce arbitral and judicial awards.

Notable cases and examples of common patterns

Business disputes

In re Furstenberg Fin. SAS v. Litai Assets LLC, 877 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2017). Minority shareholders planning to file a foreign criminal complaint with a civil-damages claim qualify as “interested persons” through their participation rights, and a criminal investigation conducted before formal accusation is a qualifying proceeding. The court also held that an order denying a motion to quash a Section 1782 subpoena is a final, appealable order.

In re Refinería de Cartagena S.A.S., No. 23-mc-455 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2024). Discovery from an investment manager for use in English and Dutch restructuring proceedings. The court read the “for use” requirement broadly—the applicant’s burden is de minimis, and the evidence need not be admissible or even discoverable abroad—explained that the first Intel factor turns on whether the foreign tribunal can control the evidence rather than the party, and tailored the overbroad requests instead of denying them outright.

In re Application of Luis Aron, Case No. 3:23-mc-00841-AN (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2024). Petitioner states that he is involved in multiple legal proceedings in the Republic of Paraguay related to a dispute between himself and the "Gomez Family" regarding the ownership and finances of Doral, a corporation that is "the exclusive licensee for Adidas in Paraguay." In November 2019, petitioner filed a lawsuit against the Gomez Family in Paraguay, and he is now attempting to enforce a resultant court order granting him access to Doral's books and records. In August 2020, the Gomez Family "knowingly and intentionally filed false criminal charges" against petitioner, and as a result, a Paraguayan court issued an "international capture order" against him. Petitioner "recently" commenced a criminal action against the Gomez Family, and in August 2023, a Paraguayan court ordered a raid of Doral's offices in connection with the criminal investigation. Petitioner seeks information from the Adidas Entities that he believes will assist him in the Paraguayan legal proceedings, specifically in determining the period and extent of the Gomez Family's control of Doral, whether the Gomez Family has sought kickbacks, and any representations that the Gomez Family made about petitioner's role in Doral's business affairs. Note: this is an example of a pattern of entanglements fairly common in matters arising from Latin America.

In re Frasers Grp. PLC, Civil Action No. 23-2279 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2024). Frasers filed a civil claim in the High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, Commercial Court, alleging among other things that a London Morgan Stanley subsidiary's decision to impose a margin call of more than $900 million on Saxo Bank relating to Hugo Boss call option was arbitrary and capricious, and asserting claims under English law for the torts of inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means.

In re Ex Parte Application of Sumitomo Pharma UK Holdings, Ltd., No. 24-MC-290 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025). A minority investor who filed an appraisal proceeding sought discovery for use in Bermuda.

In re Ex Parte Application of Nokia, No. 23-01395 (D. Del. Apr. 18, 2024) and In re Ex Parte Amazon, No. 24-493 (D. Del. Jan. 16, 2025). Amazon and Nokia engaged in an unusual tit-for-tat arising from patent infringement litigation in Europe. Both applications were decided by the same court and both were denied, albeit on different grounds. Nokia's application was denied on Intel discretionary factors after observing that part of it was likely a "fishing expedition" to determine whether an action it expected to file would be viable. Amazon's application was denied based on the weighing of the Intel factors, particularly the possibility that the requested discovery could be ordered by German courts.

In re Man Group, No. 24-MC-559 (JHR) (OTW), 2025 WL 846134, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025). Seeking to identify individuals believed to have been involved in a billion-dollar bribery scheme.

Tracing assets

In re Niedbalski, No. 21-mc-747 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2023). The applicant sought wire-transfer and bank records from third-party financial institutions to use against an adversary. The court confirmed that the target of such discovery has standing to intervene to protect its interests, and reaffirmed that Section 1782 carries no foreign-discoverability requirement and no quasi-exhaustion requirement.

In re Byrne, No. 23-mc-48 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023). Bank-record discovery for use in enforcing a foreign judgment and in a reasonably contemplated foreign criminal proceeding. The judgment debtor was allowed to intervene but was denied access to the produced records, given a real risk he would alert others and move assets; bank customers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records.

In re Application of Golden Meditech Holdings Ltd., No. 24 MISC. 24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2024). Applicant sought discovery from fourteen banks to trace allegedly misappropriated funds.

In re Application of Ken Sato, No. 5:26-mc-80093 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2026) (granting an ex parte application by a Japanese victim of an online romance-and-investment fraud scheme to subpoena the cryptocurrency exchange OKX, headquartered in the district, for the know-your-customer and account records needed to identify the anonymous perpetrator and trace the transferred funds, for use in a contemplated civil action for fraud and unjust enrichment in Tokyo).

Probate and family law

Helga M. Glock v. Glock, Inc., 797 F.3d 1002 (11th Cir. 2015). Discovery was sought from U.S. Glock entities for use in an Austrian divorce. The Eleventh Circuit held that Section 1782 does not, as a matter of law, bar the later use—including domestic use—of evidence lawfully obtained under it; a party concerned about reuse may seek a protective order, and the third Intel factor already guards against using foreign litigation as a ruse for U.S. discovery.

In re De Holguin, 20-23410-MC (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2020). The application sought the production of documents and depositions from law firm Shutts & Bowen LLC and attorney Maria Del Pilar Rubio. According to the application, Ms. Rubio had a romantic relationship with the Decedent and exercised undue influence over him in the procurement of a will executed in Florida. Applicant, Mary Ann James de Holguin, had been married to the decedent for at least twenty years before his death, sought to invalidate that Florida will in a Colombian proceeding.

In re Application of Atiku Abubakar, 1:23-cv-05099 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 19, 2023) was an unusual Application to uncover educational records from a university to challenge the eligibility of a presidential candidate in Nigeria.

Revealing the identity of anonymous and pseudonymous internet personas

Beijing TrueLake Culture Dev. Ltd. v. NetEase, Inc., No. 22-mc-80238 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023). The court granted an ex parte application to subpoena a U.S. parent to identify infringers and quantify infringement for a copyright suit in the Beijing Internet Court. Although the target was related to the foreign defendant, the first Intel factor favored discovery because the evidence could not be obtained from the non-party in China.

In re Ex Parte Application of Seyeon In, Case No. 5:24-mc-80285 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2024). Applicant "is an influencer and streamer who uses the nickname 'Juice Seyeon' on YouTube, Instagram, and Afreeca TV." She seeks identity of anonymous defamer. Note: this is the most common use of Section 1782 Applications filed from East Asia.

See In re The Born Korea, Co. Ltd., No. 5:25-mc-80388 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2026) (granting in part and denying in part a motion to quash a Google subpoena that sought to identify the owners of YouTube accounts sued for defamation in South Korea, and narrowing the subpoena to the name, address, and date of birth needed to name the defendants).

Dannacher v. Cloudflare, Inc., No. 24-MC-80066 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2024). The court granted an application to support a criminal complaint in Dubai. Applicant is a Swiss citizen residing in Dubai, UAE, who received a series of emails from an unknown source demanding payment to deactivate a website accusing him of money laundering. Applicant's business associate received an email threatening to post a similar website targeting him unless Applicant paid. Applicant's wife also received an email threatening to expose her as a "criminal husband wife."

Liapis v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 24-MC-80267-PHK, 2025 WL 1294651 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2025). The court granted an application seeking user identification to support a criminal defendant's challenge to his prosecution in Australia.

In re Gliner, No. 24-4624, 133 F.4th 927, 2025 WL 968393, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a "§ 1782 application due to its assumed impacts on the [publisher's] First Amendment right of anonymity. But the First Amendment may not protect [them] at all. '[F]oreign citizens outside U.S. territory do not possess rights under the U.S. Constitution,' including those under the First Amendment."

In re Application of Thomas Carver, No. 3:26-mc-80116 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2026). The court granted an ex parte application to subpoena Meta for the subscriber data needed to identify an anonymous Facebook user, for use in a civil defamation suit the applicant was preparing to file in Costa Rica. It treated that suit as within reasonable contemplation because he had retained Costa Rican counsel who attested to potential liability for defamation under Costa Rican law. Because the allegedly defamatory comment appeared beneath an article by a U.S. news outlet discussing conduct in the United States, the court held that unmasking the speaker could implicate the First Amendment even though he or she claimed to be in Costa Rica. It therefore applied the framework for identifying anonymous speakers—directing Meta to notify the account holder so that he or she could object, requiring the applicant to make a prima facie showing on the merits, and balancing the equities—rather than treating the speaker's location abroad as the end of the inquiry.

Abuse of the Section 1782 process

In re Postalis, No. 18-mc-497 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2018). Discovery was denied as not “for use” in the foreign proceeding where the applicant’s own public statements showed that the real purpose was to plead a future U.S. lawsuit—to avoid going in “blind.” That is improper pre-action discovery, and a protective order limiting use abroad would not cure the defect.

In re Venequip, S.A. v. Caterpillar Inc., 83 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2023), and Banoka S.À.R.L. v. Elliott Mgmt. Corp., 148 F.4th 54 (2d Cir. 2025). Both courts of appeals affirmed denials and confirmed that a contractual forum-selection clause is a permissible—and potentially important—factor in the Intel discretionary analysis. The Second Circuit went further, holding that a court may weigh such a clause against discovery even where the opponent identifies no specific proof-gathering restriction in the chosen forum.

In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The landmark Section 1782 campaign arising from the Lago Agrio litigation in Ecuador. The court refused to quash subpoenas served on opposing counsel, holding that the attorney-client privilege does not cover a lawyer’s public-relations, lobbying, or political work, that the crime-fraud exception can vitiate privilege and work product, and that a witness must assert privilege question by question rather than by a blanket refusal.

In re Montilla, No. 8:19-cv-549 (D. Neb. May 21, 2020). Discovery for Venezuelan proceedings was denied: the requests reached beyond what Venezuelan procedure allows and so would circumvent Venezuela’s proof-gathering rules, much of the information was available from persons within Venezuela, the evidence was not “for use” at the current appellate stage, and a U.S. protective order might be unenforceable there.

In re Ex Parte Application of Dr. Fredric Eshelman, Case No. 5:23-mc-80015 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2023) is noteworthy as an example of an Application that was granted initially as facially sufficient but later voluntarily dismissed when it was opposed by Google and the John Doe represented by the ACLU. The Application, by an American citizen, sought to uncover the identity of an anonymous American defamer by relying on actions that the applicant intended to bring in Germany and India. In my opinion, this was a clear abuse of the Section 1782 process to circumvent otherwise applicable U.S. law that would protect the defamer's identity and his exercise of First Amendment rights. See Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975–76 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

Misc

In re Kingstown Partners Master Ltd., No. 21-mc-691 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2022). A district court may shift the cost of complying with Section 1782 discovery onto the applicant, borrowing the Rule 45 analysis. The share turns on three factors—whether the non-party has an interest in the outcome, whether it can more readily bear the cost, and whether the litigation is of public importance—and here the applicant was ordered to bear half of the respondents’ future compliance costs.

In re Terra Invest, LLC, No. 21-cv-23332 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2022). On the “resides or is found” requirement for an individual: residence means domicile under state law, and a person is “found” only through personal service in the district or a nexus between the requested discovery and the person’s forum contacts. Counsel’s acceptance of service with reservations was not enough, and the failure left the court without jurisdiction.

In re Inmobiliaria Tova, S.A., No. 20-mc-24981 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2021). The corporate counterpart on “resides or is found”: a U.S. parent was not “found” because a corporation must be subject to general jurisdiction under the Daimler “at home” standard, and transient “tag” service does not apply to corporations. The first Intel factor also weighed against discovery because the parent was effectively a participant in the contemplated Venezuelan proceeding.

Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2013). On the scope of materials reachable from a testifying expert, the court held that the work-product doctrine does not shield a testifying expert’s own notes or communications with non-attorneys, and that “facts or data” covers everything the expert considered except the core opinion work product of attorneys.

In re Newbrook Shipping Corp., 31 F.4th 889 (4th Cir. 2022). The “for use” requirement must be satisfied for each category of evidence, not the application as a whole; after rejecting one contemplated foreign action as too speculative, the district court should not have granted the entire application without limiting discovery to the qualifying proceeding. The court also held that Rule 45 requires delivery of the subpoena to an authorized agent—actual notice is not enough.

Department of Caldas v. Diageo PLC, 925 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2019). On the receptivity factor, the court declined to impose a rigid burden on either side, looking instead to both parties for support; a party that offers only a blanket assertion risks losing the point. The court also held that a joint application may be granted for the eligible applicants even where co-applicants do not qualify.

In re Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V., No. 23-mc-43 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2023). A useful articulation of the “reasonable contemplation” requirement: the applicant must show objective indicia that a foreign proceeding will actually be brought, assessed against a five-factor guide—the contemplated claims, the preparations made (such as retaining foreign counsel), the tribunal, the time frame, and the supporting evidence. A detailed affidavit from Dutch counsel identifying specific tort claims sufficed.

In re Ex Parte Application of National Bank Trust, Case No. 3:20-mc-85 (D. Conn. Mar. 7, 2023), involved the interplay of Section 1782 and OFAC sanctions against Russia, given that the petitioner's majority owner was a sanctioned entity. The court found that the sanctions regime did not prohibit discovery in aid of execution of a judgment entered in the United Kingdom. See also In re Public Joint Stock Co. National Bank Trust § 1782 Action, No. 1:23-mc-00134 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2026) (a separate, later National Bank Trust matter granting intervention but denying motions to quash subpoenas issued in aid of British Virgin Islands proceedings, and rejecting the argument that the petitioner's status as a Russian state-controlled bank barred relief).

United States v. Zubaydah, 595 U.S. 195 (2022), involved Abu Zubaydah, a detainee in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, who sought to subpoena two former Central Intelligence Agency contractors to obtain information (for use in Polish litigation) about his treatment in 2002 and 2003 at a CIA detention site, which Zubaydah claimed was located in Poland. The Supreme Court held that the state secrets doctrine applies to Section 1782 discovery.

In re Application of the Republic of Türkiye, Case No. 24 Misc. 557, 2025 WL 2200159 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025), a previously granted Application was vacated and subpoenas quashed when the movant persuaded the court that "Türkiye's application does not represent a bona fide attempt to seek evidence relevant to the criminal matters involving him, but is instead part of a years-long campaign of harassment and retaliation against the Turkish government's political enemies and the Gülen movement in particular."

Circuit splits and unsettled questions

Several recurring questions under Section 1782 have produced genuine disagreement among the courts. A practitioner deciding where to file, and anticipating the opposition's arguments, should keep the following divisions in mind.

Whether "resides or is found" reaches the full limits of personal jurisdiction

The statute authorizes discovery from a person who "resides or is found" in the district, and the circuits disagree about how far "found" extends. The Second Circuit holds that the phrase reaches the full limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, so that a corporation may be "found" wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including through transient "tag" service. In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 527-28 (2d Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected that reading, holding that "found" carries its established meaning of physical presence—a corporation is "found" only where it is present through officers or agents carrying on its business, or where it has designated an agent to receive process—and is not coextensive with the modern personal-jurisdiction standard of International Shoe. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novartis Pharma AG, 37 F.4th 160 (4th Cir. 2022). The practical consequence is that a respondent reachable in the Second Circuit may be beyond the statute's reach in the Fourth.

Whether Section 1782 reaches documents located outside the United States

Early district court decisions divided over whether Section 1782 categorically bars discovery of documents located abroad. The two circuits to address the question squarely have rejected any per se bar. The Eleventh Circuit holds that the statute reaches responsive documents located outside the United States so long as the compelled party has "possession, custody, or control" of them, because the statute authorizes production in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2016). The Second Circuit likewise holds that there is no per se bar to the extraterritorial application of Section 1782, while emphasizing that the location of the evidence remains a factor the district court may weigh in exercising its discretion. In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2019).

Whether private commercial arbitration qualifies (resolved)

Before 2022 the circuits split over whether a private foreign arbitral panel was a "foreign or international tribunal." The conflict was crystallized by a single litigant, Servotronics, which obtained opposite results in two circuits: the Fourth Circuit held that the private arbitral panel qualified, Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2020), while the Seventh Circuit held that it did not, Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court resolved the question in ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022), holding that a "foreign or international tribunal" must be governmental or intergovernmental and that private adjudicatory bodies fall outside Section 1782.

Whether a Section 1782 application is "dispositive"

Courts disagree about whether a freestanding Section 1782 application is a "dispositive" matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), which determines whether a magistrate judge may decide it by order or must instead proceed by report and recommendation subject to de novo review. The Ninth Circuit has held that such an application is dispositive, because it seeks the only relief at issue in the federal case, so a magistrate judge cannot enter a binding order without the parties' consent. CPC Patent Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 34 F.4th 801 (9th Cir. 2022). Many district courts, by contrast, treat a Section 1782 application as an ordinary, non-dispositive discovery matter that a magistrate judge may resolve by order. This is the same division reflected in the discussion of Reports and Recommendations above.

The standard for foreign privilege and receptivity

A related, still-developing divergence concerns how rigorously a court must scrutinize positions grounded in foreign law. The Second Circuit requires "authoritative proof" that a foreign tribunal would reject Section 1782 evidence before discovery may be denied on receptivity grounds, Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995), and some district courts have applied that demanding standard to assertions of foreign privilege as well. The Fourth Circuit, while agreeing that the party asserting a foreign privilege bears the burden of establishing it, has declined to adopt the "authoritative proof" standard. In re Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A., 126 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2025).

Frequently asked questions

What is 28 U.S.C. § 1782?

Section 1782 allows a foreign tribunal, a litigant, or another interested person to obtain evidence from persons found in the United States for use in a foreign proceeding. Used correctly, it is a powerful and strategic tool.

What does a Section 1782 application have to show?

An application has four mandatory statutory requirements and four discretionary elements. The key Supreme Court opinion interpreting the statute is Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).

Can Section 1782 be used for a foreign arbitration?

Generally no. After ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022), a private foreign arbitration is not a qualifying “tribunal.” Discovery can be used in an arbitration only if that use is secondary or ancillary to a primary acceptable use in a qualifying tribunal, and such a secondary use may be conditioned in some way.

Can a Section 1782 application be filed ex parte?

Yes. In a departure from the normal adversary process, applications are often filed and granted ex parte. Courts may require service of the application on the adversary party in the foreign proceeding, and the duty of candor toward the court is heightened in ex parte proceedings.

Where is a Section 1782 application filed?

It is filed in the U.S. district court in which the person from whom discovery is sought can be found. If discovery is sought from people found in different districts, a separate application is required for each. In districts where applications are common (S.D.N.Y., S.D. Fla., N.D. Cal.) the turnaround may be days or weeks.

Does the foreign proceeding have to be pending already?

No. The proceeding may be existing or “within reasonable contemplation.” But the future proceedings must be more than speculative, and a court must insist on reliable indications that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time.

What are the four Intel discretionary factors?

Even if every statutory requirement is met, a court may still deny an application after weighing four discretionary factors: (1) whether the respondent is a participant in the foreign proceeding; (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal and its receptivity to Section 1782 assistance; (3) whether the request circumvents foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies; and (4) whether the discovery request is unduly burdensome.

Can discovery be sought from a lawyer or law firm?

Yes. The “person” from whom discovery is sought may be an attorney or law firm, who can be compelled to provide non-privileged records in their possession, custody, or control.

How can a subpoena target fight a Section 1782 subpoena?

A subpoena target may challenge the sufficiency of the application itself, move to quash or modify the subpoena, or seek a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. In addition, an interested person, such as an adversary in the foreign proceeding, may intervene to challenge the application, provided the intervention is timely.

Does "resides or is found" reach the full limits of personal jurisdiction?

The circuits disagree. The Second Circuit reads the phrase to extend to the full limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, while the Fourth Circuit limits it to physical presence. The practical result is that a respondent reachable in one circuit may be beyond the statute's reach in another.

Can Section 1782 reach documents located outside the United States?

There is no per se bar. The two circuits to address the question squarely, the Eleventh and the Second, have held that the statute can reach responsive documents located abroad so long as the person from whom discovery is sought has possession, custody, or control of them, though the location of the evidence may bear on the court's discretion.

Is a Section 1782 application "dispositive" for purposes of magistrate-judge authority?

Courts divide. The Ninth Circuit treats a freestanding application as dispositive, so a magistrate judge cannot enter a binding order without the parties' consent, while many district courts treat it as an ordinary, non-dispositive discovery matter that a magistrate judge may resolve by order.

Glossary of terms of art

Resides or is found: The statutory hook for reaching a person. Some circuits read it to extend to the full limits of personal jurisdiction; others limit it to physical presence. The dividing line is discussed under Circuit splits.
For use: The evidence must be capable of being "employed with some advantage or serve some use" in the foreign proceeding, and the applicant must have the practical ability to inject it into that proceeding. It need not be necessary to prevail.
Interested person: The person entitled to apply. The term is given an expansive definition and includes litigants and complainants who can trigger or participate in a proceeding, but it is not infinitely elastic.
Within reasonable contemplation: The standard for a not-yet-filed proceeding. The proceeding need not be pending or imminent, but it must be more than speculative, supported by reliable indications that it will be instituted within a reasonable time.
Foreign or international tribunal: A governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body. Private arbitral panels fall outside the term after ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619 (2022).

Table of authorities

Every authority on this page that is linked to its full opinion, listed alphabetically (101 opinions). Links open the opinion on Midpage.

Recent Section 1782 developments and in-depth articles

In-depth analyses of recent Section 1782 decisions, updated as new ones come down.

Where a Person Is “Found” Under Section 1782: The Circuit Split — the Second and Fourth Circuits divide on what “is found” means: the Second Circuit ties it to personal jurisdiction (del Valle Ruiz), the Fourth to physical presence (Eli Lilly v. Novartis), so the choice of forum can decide whether discovery issues.
Foreign Privilege Under Section 1782: The “Authoritative Proof” Split — Section 1782 shields material protected by a foreign legal privilege, but the circuits divide on the quantum of proof; the Second Circuit demands “authoritative proof,” while the Fourth Circuit in Banorte (2025) reserved the question.
Tracing Assets Through US Banks With Section 1782 — Section 1782 reaches bank records held by U.S. institutions, including the New York branches and agencies of foreign banks, to trace funds and enforce judgments; recent S.D.N.Y. orders map the jurisdictional key and the limits.
Section 1782 for Latin American Litigation — how litigants in Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico use Section 1782 to obtain U.S. evidence: the “reasonable contemplation” opening, the enforcement teeth, and the comity trap that can sink an application.
Section 1782’s Intel Discretion Trap: Lessons from GSK’s Vaccine-Patent Discovery Bids — GSK met every statutory requirement of Section 1782, yet a magistrate judge recommended quashing its subpoenas against Moderna and Pfizer on the discretionary Intel factors—a caution for discovery aimed at an opponent in the foreign proceeding, including before the Unified Patent Court.
Section 1782 and the Control Requirement: Reaching a Foreign Affiliate’s Documents — when a U.S. respondent is subpoenaed for documents its foreign affiliate holds, the applicant must prove possession, custody, or control; In re Tour des Finances (S.D.N.Y. 2026) denied a renewed petition where that showing failed, holding that discovery sought only to probe a respondent’s access is not “for use” in the foreign proceeding.
The Salinas Pliego Order: How Section 1782 Unlocks Cross-Border Evidence — how a litigant used Section 1782 to trace alleged fraud proceeds through U.S. banks for a London case, and why In re Pliego (S.D.N.Y. 2026) holds that material lawfully obtained under the statute may be used in other proceedings unless the court orders otherwise.

About the author

Jorge Schmidt practices at Legal Schmidt PLLC, a Miami firm focused on cross-border discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, international judicial assistance, and complex commercial litigation. He has been a member of The Florida Bar since 2004. Contact: jorge@spllc.law · 305 902 5125 · LinkedIn.